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ABSTRACT 
 
Machinery Sharing by Agribusiness Firms: Methodology, Application, and Simulation. 
(December 2008)  
Jared L. Wolfley, B.S., Cornell University;  
M.S., University of Idaho 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. James W. Mjelde 
 
Machinery investments represent a substantial portion of agribusiness firms’ 
costs.  Because of high machinery costs, variable profit margins, and increasing 
competition, agribusiness managers continually seek methods to maintain profitability 
and manage risk.  One relatively new method is jointly owning and sharing machinery.  
Contract design issues to enhance horizontal linkages between firms through machinery 
sharing are addressed.  Specifically, costs and depreciation sharing between two firms 
entering into a joint machinery ownership contract are examined.   
Two, two-player models, a Nash equilibrium game theoretical model and an 
applied two-farm simulation model are used to determine impacts of machinery sharing 
on firms engaged in machinery sharing.  The Nash equilibrium model determines 
theoretical optimal sharing rules for two generic firms.  Using the Nash equilibrium 
model as the basis, the two-farm simulation model provides more specific insights into 
joint harvest machinery sharing.  Both models include contractual components that are 
uniquely associated with machinery sharing.  Contractual components include penalty 
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payment structure for untimely machinery delivery and the percentages of shared costs 
paid and depreciation claimed paid by each firm.  Harvesting windows for each farm and 
yield reductions associated with untimely machinery delivery are accounted for within 
the models.   
Machinery sharing can increase the NPV of after tax cash flows and potentially 
reduce risk.  Sharing will, however, not occur if own marginal transaction costs and/or 
marginal penalty costs associated with untimely machinery delivery are too large.  
Further, if the marginal costs of sharing are small relative to own marginal net benefits, 
sharing will not occur.   
There are potential tradeoffs between the percentage of shared costs paid and the 
percentage of shared depreciation claimed depending on each farms’ specific tax 
deductions.  Harvesting window overlaps help determine the viability of machinery 
sharing.  Farms may be better off sharing larger, more efficient machinery than using 
smaller machinery even when harvest must be delayed.  Percentages of shared costs, 
depreciation, and tax deductions have important tax implications that impact the after tax 
cash flows and should be considered when negotiating machinery sharing contracts.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Agribusiness firms continually seek ways to reduce costs and improve machinery 
management to maintain profitability.  Unfortunately, most ways of reducing machinery 
costs involve a decrease in net returns, tradeoffs exist.  Consider the decision to purchase 
a new machine.  Purchasing a lower quality machine may reduce initial costs, but 
additional repairs negatively affect productivity and costs, therefore, net returns.  If the 
decision is made to purchase a higher quality machine, initial costs are higher, but fewer 
repairs and increased productivity may offset the increase in costs.  Within most 
agribusiness firms, machinery costs represent a large portion of total capital outlays.  
Machinery costs, for example, are typically the largest annual non-land expense that 
agricultural producers face, accounting for up to 41 percent of annual farm production 
costs (Schwalbe 2006).   
Machinery management options available to managers include purchasing the 
machinery independently, leasing, custom contracting, or sharing machinery ownership.  
This study focuses on sharing machinery.  Machinery sharing is defined as the use of a 
single piece or set of machinery by two or more firms.  Obviously, not all machines can 
be shared.  However, because some machines are used sparingly and because of 
seasonality in production, businesses in agricultural production, forestry, and road 
____________ 
The style and format of this dissertation follows that of the American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
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construction may benefit from machinery sharing.  Sharing may reduce total capital 
investment, reduce risk, and allow firms access to higher quality, larger capacity, and/or 
additional machines.  Additional or larger capacity machinery may improve production 
timeliness which can increase returns when seasonality is important.  
Producers in the U.S., in an effort to improve farm profitability, reduce costs, and 
manage risk, are beginning to adopt unique managed lease and joint machinery 
ownership programs (Schwalbe 2006).  In the last two decades, equipment companies 
that provide alternative equipment options have seen increased growth (Schwalbe 2006; 
MH Equipment 2007; and Caterpillar 2007).  A potential advantage of multi-firm 
utilization of machinery is that firms of all sizes may benefit from implementing 
machinery sharing.  Through machinery sharing, small firms may have access to larger, 
more efficient machinery that would otherwise not be affordable.  Productivity may also 
increase because of production timeliness through the use of newer, more efficient 
equipment.  Similar to small firms, large firms may also be able to reduce capital 
investment costs and potentially capitalize on economies of size.  Firms sharing 
machinery, however, may face decreased production if the shared machines are not 
available when needed. 
Firms sharing machinery will experience an increase in transaction costs.  For 
machinery sharing, little to no research has been conducted on the effects of machinery 
sharing contractual, negotiation, and transaction costs impacts on a firm’s bottom line.  
The limited research that has been published considers machinery sharing in the context 
of co-operatives and agricultural production outside the U.S.  As such, this dissertation is 
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the first comprehensive study of contractual issues associated with machinery sharing 
impacts on farm’s net returns.  To overcome this limited prior research, machinery 
dealers and producers from the Association of Agricultural Production Executives that 
are currently or that are considering machinery sharing were interviewed throughout the 
completion of this dissertation.       
Objectives 
The overall objective of this dissertation is to examine the impacts of machinery 
sharing on two firms that enter into a machinery sharing contract.  To accomplish this 
overall objective, the dissertation addresses two sub-objectives.  The first sub-objective 
is to determine the optimal machinery cost sharing rules on how initial investment and 
maintenance costs should be shared between two firms that are entering into a joint 
ownership contract.  The second sub-objective is to determine how machinery sharing 
impacts the net present value of after tax cash flows for firms engaged in machinery 
sharing. 
To satisfy these objectives, two models are developed, a Nash equilibrium 
theoretical and an applied two-farm simulation model.  The single period Nash 
equilibrium model for two firms sharing machinery is developed to determine theoretical 
optimal sharing rules.  Optimal machinery sharing rules are defined as the percentages of 
total shared machinery costs borne by each firm.  Because few studies have considered 
the economics of machinery sharing, the Nash equilibrium model is one advancement in 
addressing this void in the literature.  Harvesting windows and different penalty 
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structures associated with untimely machinery delivery are considered.  The Nash 
equilibrium model is general enough to accommodate most types of machinery sets.   
The second sub-objective is achieved by using the theoretical model as the basis 
for an empirical simulation model of two farms sharing machinery.  Because the 
functional forms used in the Nash equilibrium model are general, no specific results are 
obtained.  The simulation model overcomes the generality of the Nash equilibrium 
model.  More specifically, the two-farm simulation model is used to: 1) determine the 
impact of machinery sharing on a firm’s net present value of after tax cash flows; 2) 
examine contractual issues, percentage of shared costs, penalty payment structure, and 
percentage of shared machinery depreciation; and 3) evaluate machinery sharing as a 
risk reduction management tool. 
The two-farm simulation model is unique in that two farms are simultaneously 
simulated with both firm specific and joint components.  Firm specific components 
include yields, prices, land attributes, non-shared machinery, and percentages of debt 
free land and non-shared machinery.  Joint components include negotiated contractual 
items that affect both producers.  As previously mentioned, contractual issues examined 
include the percentage of shared machinery costs, penalty payments for untimely 
machinery delivery, and the percentage of shared machinery depreciation claimed by 
each farm.  Climate variability and harvesting windows are accounted for within the 
two-farm simulation model.  A crop growth model, which uses farm specific weather 
data, is used to generate yields and maturity dates for each.  Harvesting window 
sensitivity analysis is conducted by considering farm locations in diverse geographic 
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locations.  Various combinations of farms located in Texas, Colorado, and Montana are 
simulated.  The two-farm simulation model is used to evaluate machinery sharing as a 
method to increase NPV of after tax cash flows and decrease risk compared to each farm 
independently buying the machinery.   
Organization 
This dissertation is organized in a traditional dissertation format consisting of 
seven separate chapters.  This first chapter consists of an introduction with 
accompanying research objectives.  The second chapter is a literature review.  The 
review consists of general theory related to machinery sharing, as well as, literature 
specific to machinery sharing.  Observations from discussions with agricultural 
producers currently engaged in machinery sharing are also included in this chapter.  The 
theoretical model, developed in Chapter III, provides the foundation for the two-farm 
machinery sharing simulation model developed in Chapters IV and V.  A discussion of 
the crop growth model and inputs used to determine crop yields and harvesting windows 
are presented in Chapter IV.  The development of the empirical two-farm simulation 
model is completed in Chapter V.  Results from the simulation models are presented in 
Chapter VI.  Conclusions, a discussion of limitations of the research, and topics for 
further research complete the dissertation.   
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND INDUSTRY OPINION 
 
Literature related to machinery sharing is separated into broad, and in most cases, 
already extensively developed interrelated areas of research.  The key papers in contract 
theory, information-based models, investment theory, risk, and literature specific to 
machinery sharing are presented here.  A brief section on simulation modeling including 
farm and crop growth is also included.  This review does not pretend to address all the 
important issues or articles, rather selective issues in each area are presented. 
Contract and Transaction Costs Theories 
The foundation of contract and transaction costs theories began with Coase’s 
(1937) essay where transaction costs are introduced to explain firm size.  Coase (1937) 
explains that an entrepreneur begins to hire laborers when the cost of hiring is less than 
the cost of acquiring a good through the market.  Firms emerge because transaction 
costs, costs above the price of the good or service, can be avoided through 
internalization of production (integration) (Coase 1937).  From a network perspective of 
inter-organizational collaboration, there are potential gains to be realized from the 
pooling of resources (Powell 1990).  Potential gains include access to new technologies, 
economies of size in joint production, risk sharing, and access to sources of know-how 
outside the firm through strategic alliances and partnerships.  Supply chain analysis 
literature indicates that vertical interdependencies require understanding of resource 
allocation and information flows between firms engaged in sequential stages of 
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production (Christopher 1998; Simchi-Levi, Kaminski, and Simchi-Levi 2000).  Ties 
between firms in different levels of the netchain, for example, the interdependencies 
between machinery dealers and producers, are important to understanding inter-
organizational relations (Lazzarini, Chaddad, and Cook 2001).  Although Lazzarini, 
Chaddad, and Cook (2001) did not specifically consider the example of machinery 
sharing, interdependencies are important to firm governance structure and decision 
making.   
Modern contract theory surfaced in the context of share-cropping in China 
(Cheung 1969).  Cheung (1969) argues that as long as property rights are exclusive, 
specified, enforceable, and transferable, different contractual arrangements do not imply 
different efficiencies of resource allocation.  Contract theory evolved further with the 
development of principal-agent models (Stiglitz 1974; Milgrom and Roberts 1992).  
Stiglitz (1974) uses an expected utility maximizing model of a laborer and landlord to 
explain why the agricultural sector has moved away from sharecropping to wage and 
rental systems.  The inefficiency of the sharecropping system, changes in risk, 
development of capital markets, increasing capital intensity, and the increase in the rate 
of technological changes have contributed to the decline of sharecropping.  Milgrom and 
Roberts (1992) identify the basic components of contract design as informativeness, 
incentive intensity, monitoring intensity, and equal compensation principles. 
Building on previous foundational work (Coase 1937; Klein, Crawford, and 
Alchian 1978; Williamson 1979), Grossman and Hart (1986) present a theory of 
contracts where rights are divided into specific rights (rights stated in contract) and 
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residual rights (all rights not stated in contract).  They develop a two firm, two period, 
symmetric information Nash equilibrium bargaining model to explain when one firm 
will desire to acquire the assets of another (integration); the model is applied to the 
insurance industry.  Inefficiencies are found to arise from the distribution of property 
rights; ownership structure determines the nature of the investment distortions.  Even 
with ex-ante bargaining, inefficiencies can be explained by contract incompleteness.  
Because not all aspects of a contract are specified ex-ante, efficiency depends on the 
allocation of residual rights of control (Grossman and Hart 1986).  In their two firm 
model with control by firm 1, firm 1 over invests relative to the first-best solution and 
firm 2 under invests.  Similarly, with firm 2 in control, firm 2 over invests relative to the 
first-best solution and firm 1 under invests.  In the case of no integration, it is very likely 
that both firms under invest. 
More recently, stemming from Coase’s (1937) essay, the theory of the firm has 
been redeveloped and redefined into four elemental theories consisting of rent-seeking, 
property rights, incentive system, and adaptation (Gibbons 2005).  Gibbons (2005) uses 
utility maximizing principal-agent models to explain these elemental theories.  Wu 
(2006) highlights specific types of distortions identified by literature in transaction costs, 
property rights, and incentives theory.  Wu (2006) also points out that Gibbons (2005) 
provides a five-stage framework that incorporates the elemental theories into an 
integrative structure.  He argues this structure is important for developing effective 
government policy and for identifying various inefficiencies and contract distortions 
created by contracting imperfections.  Transaction cost theory focuses on ex post rent 
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seeking while property rights theory attributes ex ante negotiations as the source of 
inefficiency (Wu 2006).   
Asymmetric Information 
One focus of principal-agent theory is to explain why firms deviate from profit-
maximizing behavior, postulating that deviations can be traced to the inability of the 
principal to monitor actions of the agent.  The root of the problem stems from 
incomplete information.  Cooperative partners can misrepresent the skills, abilities, and 
resources that they bring into an alliance, which gives rise to adverse selection problems.  
Arrow (1963) shows uncertainty and asymmetric information in the medical industry 
may lead to market failure.  Akerloff (1970) later develops a theoretical model of the 
used car market as an example of an adverse selection problem.  Akerloff (1970) finds 
that with car type uncertainty (good or lemon), the lemons tend to drive out the good 
cars because it is difficult to distinguish the actual car type and both types sell at the 
same price.  Cooperative partners may also have valuable skills, abilities, and/or 
resources that are not made available to their partners, which give rise to moral hazard 
problems.  Theoretical asymmetric information literature is well developed (Akerlof 
1970; Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976; Wilson 1977).  For a general overview of the 
principal-agent framework see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), where distinctions are 
made between hidden action (moral hazard) models and hidden knowledge models 
(adverse selection).   
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Investment Theory       
Project investments are often evaluated on their net present value (NPV), which 
is the aggregation of the discounted periodic net after tax cash flows occurring 
throughout the project life.  Investment and decision theory indicate that when NPV is 
positive, it is profitable to undertake a project (Just, Hueth, and Schmitz 2004).  When 
cash flows are uncertain, NPV becomes probabilistic.  In the probabilistic case, NPV is 
often expressed using its mean and variance to account for the uncertainty in cash flows 
(Bussey 1978).  The mean-variance portfolio analysis is superior to considering only the 
discounted expected value of future net returns because future net returns are uncertain; 
the inclusion of variance accounts for risk (Markowitz 1952).  
Contrary to the Marshallian criterion of shutting down operations if variable 
costs are cannot be covered, Dixit (1992) shows that if the investment satisfies certain 
conditions, the point of abandonment should be at a critical level of operating profit that 
is below the Marshallian criterion.  The point made is that there is value in waiting to 
make a decision because investors are able to minimize downside risk while realizing the 
upside potential (Dixit 1992).  This idea has given rise to the real options literature.  In 
the case of machinery sharing, there may be value in establishing a machinery sharing 
contract such that the first machinery user has the option to delay machinery delivery to 
the second user.  Of course exercising such an option would come at a cost.  Any 
additional gains from postponing machinery delivery plus the cost of exercising the 
option must outweigh any penalties to be paid to the second user.     
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Risk 
With uncertainty in outcomes, decisions are made according to a subjective 
probability theory where beliefs are focused on the occurrence of future events.  The 
expected value is the weighted average of the outcomes (Simon and Blume 1994).  The 
subjective expected utility theory hypothesis proposed by Savage (1954) states that the 
utility of a risky alternative is the decision maker’s expected utility for that alternative 
where utilities are independent of the underlying state of nature and outcomes are 
assigned subjective probabilities independent of actions.  Rabin and Thaler (2001) point 
out that the subjective expected utility theory hypothesis is flawed as a behavioral theory 
of choice.  Subjected expected utility, however, is also argued to be the most appropriate 
theory for prescriptive assessment of risky choices (Hardaker et al. 2004).   
Various risk efficiency criteria used to rank risk management strategies show a 
high degree of consistency in ranking among the highest ranked strategies (Gloy and 
Baker 2001).  Gloy and Baker (2001) show that rankings produced by expected return, 
stochastic dominance, mean-variance, and Sharpe ratio criteria are likely to produce 
similar results.  Hardaker et al. (2004) demonstrate stochastic efficiency with respect to a 
function orders utility efficient alternatives over a range of risk aversion levels measured 
in terms of certainty equivalents.  Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function is more 
potentially discriminating at all levels of risk aversion than stochastic dominance with 
respect to a function (Hardaker et al. 2004).   
Farmers’ risk preferences affect the probability of adopting new technologies 
(Koundouri, Nauges, and Tsouvelekas 2003).  Koundouri, Nauges, and Tsouvelekas 
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(2003) present a theoretical framework considering technology adoption in a randomly 
selected sample of farms located in Greece.  Results show that farmers who maximize 
expected utility of profit invest in new technology as a means of hedging against input-
related or cost-side production risk.   
Machinery Sharing 
Research on machinery sharing is limited.  Several studies incorporating some 
form of machinery sharing have been examined in the context of farm cooperatives (de 
Toro and Hansson 2004b; Musabelliu and Skreli 1997) and agricultural production 
(Olszweski 1997; Werschnitzky 1972).  Musabelliu and Skreli (1997), Olszweski 
(1997), and Werschnitzky (1972) address machinery sharing, but unfortunately only 
English short summaries are available.  English translation of French, Russian, and 
German summaries are obtained from Texas A&M University Libraries on-line services. 
Machinery utilization plan selections are important to a firm’s cost reduction, 
risk management, and production.  Olzsweski (1997) examines equipment sharing as a 
possible cost reduction technique.  Through modernization and equipment sharing, farm 
managers are able to reduce capital expenditures by 39 to 78 percent (Olzsweski 1997).  
de Toro and Hansson (2004b) examine a Swedish machinery cooperative taking into 
account labor, specific machinery, timeliness costs, and weather variability.  Their 
simulation model suggests machinery sharing contributes to a 15 percent reduction in 
total costs and a 50 percent reduction in investment requirements.  de Toro and Hansson 
(2004b) only examine the effects of a machinery cooperative in one region.  Sharing 
machinery between farms in different regions with different weather-determined 
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harvesting windows was not examined.  Scattered parcels of land from state farm break-
ups in Albania have led farmers to examine alternative forms of cooperation including 
cooperative use of machinery (Musabelliu and Skreli 1997).  Werschnitzky (1972) uses 
previously developed empirical investigations to describe the economic and social aims 
of interfarm co-operation for machinery sharing.  
Factors to Consider 
Previous literature has used various methodologies to characterize the 
relationship between combinations of machinery sets, labor, weather variability, and 
timeliness issues.  Models using linear programming usually include probability values 
of workable field days as inputs (Edwards and Boehlje 1980; Witney and Eradat 1982; 
Jannot and Cairol 1994; Etyang et al. 1998; Siemens 1998; Ekman 2000).  Models using 
discrete event simulation techniques are based on daily field operations for a given farm 
and include constraints on weather or soil workability, as well as, other choice variables 
(Buck, Vaughan, and Hughes 1988; Lal et al. 1991, 1992; Chen, Ahmad, and Willcutt 
1992; Parmar, McClendon, and Potter 1996; de Toro and Hansson 2004a, 2004b).   
Only a limited amount of time is available to complete critical operations.  
Timeliness, therefore, is an important factor to consider when selecting a machinery set.  
Edwards and Boehlje (1980) develop a simulation model to evaluate net machinery costs 
considering timeliness losses on corn-soybean farms.  Costs associated with untimely 
operations are difficult to estimate.  Cost estimates should consider factors such as 
acreage, size of machinery, and available labor hours by detailed cropping activity 
(Edwards and Boehlje 1980).   
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Perhaps the most important factor in machinery selection in production 
agriculture is uncertainty about the weather, thus time available for farm work.  Hill et 
al. (2000) find that weather forecast information and forecast type are valued differently 
by producers in different regions.  They conclude that weather forecasts have 
implications for producers and that forecasts need to be region specific.  Because 
weather varies by year, a risk averse farmer would generally choose a machinery set that 
is adaptable and proven to perform over a range of weather conditions even though the 
machinery set is not optimal under a single state of nature (Danok, McCarl, and White 
1980).  In cases where harvesting capacity is a limiting factor, the number or size of 
machines may need to be increased to successfully harvest in periods of peak yield 
and/or demand.  Additional capital investment required to increase harvesting capacity 
during peak yield times, however, may not be cost effective (Chen, Ahmad, and Willcutt 
1992).   
Chen, Ahmad, and Willcutt (1992) develop a simulation model of the seed cotton 
harvesting and hauling system.  They show that machinery set selection and weather 
affecting initial harvest date significantly affect cotton lint picked and total revenue.  
Parmar, McClendon, and Williams (1994) also use a simulation model to show that net 
returns can be negatively affected by the number and scale of machinery units.  Even 
when machinery sets with the highest capacity are employed, harvesting performance 
may be significantly reduced in years of extreme weather conditions (de Toro and 
Hansson 2004a).  In addition, machinery selection may play a pivotal role in harvesting 
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timeliness when seasonality affects the quality of goods produced (Mayande and 
Srinivas 2004).  
Models of collaboration allow firms to arrange resources and capabilities in 
efficient ways to produce, minimize transaction costs, and overcome gaps in 
information.  To address farm machinery sharing specifically, the literature suggests a 
variety of mathematical programming and simulation approaches as useful frameworks.  
Previous studies have given clear indications of key decision factors, although few have 
been developed specifically for shared machinery problems.   
Crop Growth Simulation Modeling 
“Crop models have many current and potential uses for improving research 
understanding, crop management decisions, policy planning and implementations, and 
adapting to current and future climate change” (Timsina and Humphreys 2006 p. 202). 
Crop growth simulation models were first developed to explain variation in crop growth, 
but uses in agricultural research have led towards strategic decision-making support, 
forecasting yields, and explorative scenario studies (Bouman et al. 1996).  Such models 
have seen increased attention in the agronomy literature because they are less time-
consuming and expensive than traditional field studies. 
 Many diverse crop models have been developed to predict growth, development 
and yields (de Wit, Brouwer, and Penning de Vries 1970; de Wit, Goudriaan, and van 
Laar 1978; van Keulen 1975; van Keulen, Penning de Vries, and Drees 1982; 
Stroosnijder 1982; Kropff and van Laar 1993; Bouman 1992, 1995; Rosenthal et al. 
1989a, 1989b; Bannayan, Crout, and Hoogenboom 2003).  Hoogenboom (2000) presents 
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an overview of crop modeling.  He discusses key inputs that are required to 
mathematically model interactions of science and the environment.  Agrometeorological 
variables including precipitation, air temperature, and solar radiation are identified as 
key input variables for simulation models to estimate agricultural production.     
Baier (1979) proposes a three group classification system for crop models that 
considers time scale, data sources, approach, purpose, and application.  The three non-
mutually exclusive proposed categories are mechanistic crop growth simulators, 
statistically based crop-weather models, and multiple regression yield models.  
Mechanistic crop growth simulation models are based on the physiological or causal 
effects between plants and environmental factors while statistical and multiple 
regression models are based on correlations between biological and physical processes.   
de Wit (1982) proposes a four phase classification system (Bouman et al. 1996; 
Hoogenboom 2000) for crop models.  Each phase incorporates additional biological 
processes, thereby increasing the complexity of the model.  The four phases (with major 
input variables in the parentheses) are: 1) growth rates determined by weather conditions 
(temperature and solar radiation); 2) water-limited production (precipitation and/or 
irrigation + phase 1 variables); 3) nitrogen limited production (soil and plant nitrogen + 
phase 2 variables); and 4) nutrient limited production (phosphorous, potassium, and 
other minerals + phase 3 variables).  Hoogenboom (1998) points out that balancing the 
level and amount of user-supplied input data is a delicate issue.  Crop growth 
development has been modeled using the first three phases, but few models include one 
or more processes at Phase 4 (Hoogenboom 2000).  Hansen et al. (2006) argues that 
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advances in climate-based crop forecasting are likely to include crop models embedded 
within climate models to account for crop influences on regional climate.   
DSSATv4, SORKAM, EPIC, CERES, SIRIUS, and CROPGRO are only a few 
of the many crop growth simulation models currently used.  The Decision Support 
System for Agrotechnology Transfer (DSSATv4), which is used this dissertation, is a 
software program designed for seasonal analysis.  DSSATv4 is one of the few models 
that can simulate crop growth and development with processes at all four phases given 
by de Wit (1982).  The model uses a combination of crop soil and weather data bases, 
management programs, crop models, and application programs to integrate the effects of 
soil, crop phenotype, weather, and management options.  DSSATv4 also provides for 
verification of crop model outputs; thus allowing users to compare simulated outcomes 
with observed results (International Consortium for Agricultural Systems Applications 
2007).  In addition, DSSATv4 includes application programs for seasonal and sequence 
analyses that assess the economic risks and environmental impacts associated with 
irrigation, fertilizer and nutrient management, climate change, soil carbon sequestration, 
climate variability, and precision management (International Consortium for 
Agricultural Systems Applications 2007).  Similar to other seasonal analysis crop 
models, DSSATv4 evaluates a management policy for a single season from which 
physiological maturity date and crop yield are obtained.   
Thornton, Dent, and Bacsi (1991) provide a description of crop growth models 
and applications using DSSATv4.  The authors show that biophysical crop models are 
being used by many organizations for development and research.  In particular, relevant 
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applications of biophysical crop models at the field, farm, regional, and national are 
provided.  At the farm level, research or development objectives may include biological 
and economic feasibility and stability or socio-economic objectives examining new 
technology adoption and reaction to change.  Unfortunately, DSSATv4 does not estimate 
yield loss associated with untimely harvest after physiological maturity.  Even though 
DSSATv4 does not include all the features needed in a two-farm simulation model, 
DSSATv4 is valuable in studying farm level crops. 
Factors Affecting Crop Yield after Maturity 
Wheat is not harvested at physiological maturity, but rather when the wheat grain 
is harvest ripe (Farrer et al. 2006).  At physiological maturity wheat grain has a moisture 
content of 37 percent (Calderini, Abeledo, and Slafer 2000), but at that moisture level 
the grain is too soft to combine.  After the grain has dried to an acceptable moisture level 
that is safe for harvesting and storage, the grain is ready to harvest.  Farrer et al. (2006) 
provides a review of how harvesting delays beyond wheat grain ripeness result in yield 
reductions caused by shattering and lodging.  The authors find that 20 percent yield 
losses are possible with only eight days between physiological maturity and harvest.  
Higher yield losses were attributed to hot, dry weather.   
Shattering is when the spike-lets or grain kernels fall from the plant (Farrer et al. 
2006).  Yield losses can reach up to 17 percent from shattering if harvest is delayed 
(Clarke and DePauw 1983).  Clarke (1981) shows that larger seed size is more 
susceptible to shattering.     
 
 19
Cereal grain yields are adversely affected by up to 50 percent from lodging 
(Stapper and Fischer 1990).  Lodging, when the crop plant stands fall over or plant 
shoots are permanently displaced from an upright position (Pinthus 1973), is often 
caused by weather events such as wind, hail, or rain.  Plant lodging reduces yields by 
making harvesting more difficult.  Fischer and Quail (1990) concludes higher yields are 
achievable with genotypes that resist lodging.  Berry et al. (2002) report that winter 
wheat suffers severe lodging every three to four years.  A wheat simulation model 
developed by Berry et al. (2003) has successfully predicted the timing and amount of 
lodging risk using plant characteristics, soil, and weather data.   
Tripathi, Sayre, and Kaul (2005) through experimental trials show that planting 
systems and cultivar selection can reduce lodging, as well as, increase grain yield by 
four percent.  Tewolde, Fernandez, and Erickson (2006) evaluated 16 wheat cultivars for 
two growing seasons.  They found that cultivars that headed later in the season had 
reduced yields of 35.3 kg ha-1 and 91.0 kg ha-1.  Cultivars that headed early 
outperformed cultivars that headed later because early-heading cultivars had a longer 
grain filling period in temperatures that were lower and more favorable (Tewolde, 
Fernandez, and Erickson 2006).   
Pests, animals, and disease also contribute to grain yield reduction.  Borman et al. 
(2002) using differential global positioning system technology, measure the impact of 
Canadian geese grazing on farm crops including wheat in Washington and Oregon.  
Paired-plot result comparisons show grain yields are reduced by up to 25 percent from 
grazing by geese.  Hudec (2007) finds that delayed harvest of spring malting barley in 
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Slovakia results in increased fungal infestation and lower kernel germination.  Biotic 
infestation, an indirect result of post-maturity moisture intensity, is one factor that 
determines the degree of down-grading in wheat (Clarke et al. 2005).  In addition, Clarke 
et al. (2005) finds loss in post-mature wheat is similar across cultivars.  
Farrer et al. (2006) shows the winter wheat can be reduced by up to 900 kg per 
hectare because of delayed harvest.  In addition, yield losses are positively related to 
total precipitation and negatively related to minimum daily temperature while harvest 
date was not significant for reduction in test weights (Farrer et al. 2006).  Because wheat 
yields decrease after the maturity date has been reached, another important aspect is 
determining the rate of yield reduction.  Yield loss rates from delayed harvest have been 
reported of up to 0.5 percent per day (Bolland 1984), 0.3 to 0.9 percent per day (Abawi 
1993), and from 5 to 18 percent for 30 days after physiological maturity (de Koning 
1973).  Abawi (1993) gives a yield loss function from shedding, quality loss from rain, 
and machine losses from gathering and separating wheat.  The yield loss function due to 
delayed harvesting is ,     
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
⋅⋅
<⋅⋅=
otherwiseYn
nifYnL
tt
ttt
t
004.0
100004.0
where Lt is the cumulative grain loss (t ha-1), 0.0004 and 0.004 are the rate of yield loss, 
nt is the number of days past maturity, and Yt (t ha-1) is the crop yield in year t (Abawi 
1993).   
Farm Economic Modeling 
Farm modeling encompasses an enormous body of literature that has been well 
documented.  Because of the amount of literature and previous documentation, the 
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literature review here only discusses a few select references. The main focus is literature 
related to farm modeling that incorporates crop growth models.   
Four volumes edited by Martin (1977a, 1977b, 1981, and 1992) provide an 
excellent survey of the agricultural economics literature including farm modeling from 
the 1940’s to early 1990’s.  More recently, two volumes edited by Gardner and Rausser 
(2001a, 2001b) review and assess the state of knowledge in agricultural economics.  
Volume 1A deals primarily with agricultural production.  In Chapter 2 of Volume 1A, 
Moschini and Hennessy (2001) review literature related to farm-level production 
decisions under risk and uncertainty.  They conclude risk has long-run implications for 
business organization of agricultural production and the structure of resource ownership. 
A selection of keynote papers and oral presentations on crop models and their 
applications from the international symposium titled “Systems Approaches for 
Agricultural Development” are highlighted in a book edited by Kropff et al. (1997).  The 
editors provide a list of references that link biophysical processes captured in crop 
models to evaluate options of resource management at the field, farm, and regional 
scales.  During the 2000 Annual Meetings of the American Society of Agronomy, a 
symposium titled “Crop Models in Research and Practice” was held.  Proceedings from 
the symposium provide material for developing crop models and applications to farm 
modeling (International Consortium for Agricultural Systems Applications 2007).  
Previously discussed books, articles, and symposiums give researchers an overview of 
crop simulation models and how they can be applied to farm economic decision 
modeling.     
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Wright and Dent (1969) were among the first researchers to integrate crop and 
farm simulation models.  The authors collaborated with an agronomist to perform 
simulations of pasture production for a sheep grazing system in Australia.  A whole-farm 
approach is used to examine the practice of growing oats versus grazing.  They find 
returns from grazing are $20.90 per acre.  Returns are reduced as the percentage of 
acreage used for winter cropping of oats is increased. 
Application of biophysical simulation models to production problems is 
discussed by Musser and Tew (1984).  They argue that biophysical simulation should be 
included among the methods of empirical methodology for research.  Dillon (1987) 
reviews the application of biophysical simulation models to agricultural economic 
research and he supports the use of biophysical simulation models to overcome data 
limitations.  Results from Dillon, Mjelde, and McCarl’s (1989) study on crop production 
decisions in the Blackland Region of Texas show that risk is important in production 
management decision making. Wheat production is more attractive to risk averse 
producers because wheat is exposed to less severe moisture conditions than spring crops 
such as corn and cotton.  Several articles cited by Dillon (1987) as supporting evidence 
of the use of biophysical crop models in farm modeling are Mapp and Eidmann (1975, 
1976), Boggess (1984), and Mjelde (1985).   
At the farm level, Mapp and Eidman (1975) use a simulation model to estimate 
soil-water-crop relations to evaluate irrigation strategies in Oklahoma.  In addition, 
Mapp and Eidman (1976) extend the use of biophysical simulation models to address 
potential implications for policy on the Ogallala aquifer.  The authors calculate expected 
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net returns for different water regulation alternatives to ascertain potential effects of 
policy.  They find net present value of farm income is greatest under the graduated tax 
policy. 
Buller and Bruning (1979) use a sequential simulation model to study the 
relationship between net farm income and land tract dispersion, rainfall, and 
management practices for a representative Northeast Kansas corn, soybean, and wheat 
farm.  Results show that increasing land dispersion would decrease net farm income for 
farm sizes exceeding 275 acres.  The authors assume that yield per acre per crop are 
identical.  The effects of rainfall on soil workability are considered.   
Lemieux, Richardson, and Nixon (1982) also used a whole-farm simulation 
model for a typical Texas High Plains cotton farm.  FLIPSIM IV, a policy simulation 
model, was used to examine the effects of switching from the Federal Crop Insurance 
Program (FCI) to the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS) low 
yield disaster program.  They found that risk averse producers would prefer the crop 
insurance coverage programs.  An extension of the FLIPSIM IV program, Simetar© 
(Richardson, Schumann, and Feldman 2006), is available as a Microsoft ® Excel add-in 
software program.  The model developed in the current study is created in Excel using 
Simetar©. 
Boggess (1984) and Hoogenboom (2000) discuss the integrated and 
interdisciplinary processes of biophysical simulation.  While Boggess (1984) relates 
behavioral theory to biophysical simulation, Hoogenboom (2000) takes a more general 
approach and focuses on the application and significance of weather and climate 
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variability in strategic and risk management decision-making.  Hoogenboom (2000) 
concludes that weather forecasts will play an important role in biophysical simulation 
models of the future.           
Mjelde (1985) uses a biophysical simulation and economic optimization model to 
evaluate climate information on corn production management decisions at the field level.  
He finds that climate forecasts have value to corn producers.  In particular he shows that 
corn yield declines with late harvesting using harvesting loss derivations from Johnson 
and Lamp (1966).   
Parmar, McClendon, and Williams (1994) demonstrate how crop growth 
simulation models can be used in farm modeling.  Peanut yield data generated from the 
crop growth model is incorporated into a machinery management model to determine the 
net returns above machinery costs for two different equipment sets.  In this dissertation, 
machinery set selection effects on timeliness of harvesting and yields are accounted for 
within the model.  A book chapter by Lal (1998) cites works that have previously 
developed models that range from simulating single operations to more sophisticated 
models simulating complete growing seasons.  Lal (1998) also provides a list of studies 
that have successfully developed whole farm simulation models that include both plant 
physiological and growth processes with operational requirements.  Stoorvogel et al. 
(2004) apply a methodology for examining tradeoffs between economic and 
environmental indicators using biophysical and econometric simulation models.  The 
methodology is applied to a potato-pasture production system in Ecuador.  The authors 
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find that with a 50 percent decrease in farm potato prices, 99 percent of all fields will 
remain under the carbofuran EPA threshold of 40 ppb.   
Finger and Schmid (2007) integrate biophysical simulations with an economic 
model to examine impacts of climate change on corn and winter wheat production in the 
Swiss Plateau.  The authors use CropSyst to generate yield data to estimate a yield 
variation function.  They find yields and yield variability are highly correlated with 
climate change and output prices.   
This literature review does not provide a comprehensive review, but rather 
presents a few select pieces within each research area that are related to machinery 
sharing.  The cited references serve as a guide and basis for understanding the structure 
and underpinnings of the models developed in the present study.  The preceding review 
of literature also provides supporting evidence of the key factors to consider when 
developing the framework for a machinery sharing problem.  Additionally, previous 
research indicates and supports the use of biophysical simulation models within farm 
economic models as a useful methodological approach.  The coupling of biophysical and 
farm economic simulation models can be used to examine potential gains that can be 
realized from machinery sharing through cost reduction, risk sharing, and efficiencies. 
Qualitative Data on Machinery Sharing 
 Because machinery sharing is not widely observed, literature and knowledge on 
the current status of machinery sharing is limited.  To overcome this limited research, 
producers either considering machinery sharing or currently involved in sharing were 
interviewed in an informal group setting.  These discussions with top agricultural 
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producers occurred at the Association of Agricultural Production Executives (AAPEX) 
2008 meetings held in San Juan, Puerto Rico.  Fifteen producers that are already 
engaged in, or are considering sharing machinery were present at the group discussion.  
Several other AAPEX members were interviewed separately.  The discussions centered 
around logistics, advantages, disadvantages, and concerns of sharing machinery.     
Machinery sharing is already implemented into several large scale farming 
operations across the U.S.  Equipment that is currently being shared ranges from wheat, 
corn, cotton, and soybean combine harvesters to manure spreaders.  No commodity 
trucks were reported to be shared.   
The most important issues to these producers when looking for potential partners 
for sharing equipment are compatibility, expectations, and trust.  The majority of 
producers agreed that most agricultural producers are trustworthy.  Overlaps in 
harvesting windows and transaction costs of sharing machinery are also considered 
important issues.  Where machinery sharing is occurring, transactions costs and trust 
issues are often eliminated because the same producer manages and uses the same 
machinery on two geographically disperse farms.   
Other producers engaged in machinery sharing addressed these important issues 
through contract negotiation.  AAPEX members currently engaged in machinery sharing 
have reduced their liability and financial risk through forming limited liability 
companies.  The limited liability company leases new equipment each year and both 
producers pay the company a percentage of the leasing costs based on machinery usage.  
Any repair costs not covered by warranty and that are caused by machinery operator 
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error are paid by the producer who is currently using the machinery.  Annual repair costs 
for combines under warranty range between $1,200 and $2,000.  No additional insurance 
is purchased because the machinery is covered under an already existing umbrella policy 
purchased by the producers.   
Other repair expenses such as belts, oil changes, and lubrication are shared 
between the producers based on machinery usage, while transportation costs are shared 
equally.  Total annual transportation costs of renting a truck to haul a single combine 
between northeast Iowa and Colorado were reported to be $7,600.  One producer noted 
that any inefficient harvesting by one producer was penalized by increased machinery 
usage and ultimately higher costs for that same producer.  AAPEX members also 
indicated that they owned their own combine heads which reduced transportation costs.  
It should be noted, however, that transportation costs varied greatly from state to state 
because of U.S. Department of Transportation regulations on oversized loads.  Trucks 
with oversized loads are only allowed on the road at specific times of the day and days 
of the week.         
The qualitative understanding of machinery sharing practices, along with the 
published models, provides a baseline for the development of this dissertation.  
Deviations from information obtained in the discussions with AAPEX members are 
specifically addressed in the two-farm simulation model development.    
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CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
 Consider two economic agents considering buying new machinery (Figure 3.1).  
The agents must make a decision as to either buy and use the machinery independently 
or buy the machinery and share in its use.  If the agents choose to buy independently, 
they each determine equipment size, receive their own returns, and pay all ownership 
and transaction costs.  However, if the agents choose to share machinery ownership, they 
still receive all their own returns and pay all own variable and transaction costs, but each 
agent will only pay a percentage of the shared machinery and transaction costs.  Further, 
if ownership is shared, the agents must determine provisions associated with the 
contract.   
Contract provisions including how machinery costs, initial investment, and 
maintenance costs should be shared between two firms are addressed in this chapter.  
A single period Nash-equilibrium theoretical model for two firms sharing machinery is 
developed and used to determine the theoretical optimal sharing rules.  As defined in 
Chapter I, optimal machinery sharing rules are the percentages of total shared machinery 
costs borne by each firm (agent).  This chapter is concerned with setting up the 
machinery sharing problem and the cost sharing rules associated with the sharing 
component of the overall decision process. 
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Agent 1 
Buy 
Individual Actions 
• Receives own revenues  
• Pays own variable costs 
• Pays own transaction costs 
 
Shared Actions 
• Pays percentage of shared costs and 
transaction costs 
• Penalty costs for untimely delivery 
• Determines equipment size 
Agent 2 
Buy 
Individual Actions 
• Receives own revenues 
• Pays all costs 
• Pays transaction costs 
• Determines equipment size 
Share 
Ownership 
Individual Actions 
• Receives own revenues 
• Pays all costs 
• Pays transaction costs 
• Determines equipment size 
Share 
Ownership 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Machinery sharing decision tree for two economic agents with complete 
information 
 
Nash Equilibrium Theoretical Game 
To determine the optimal cost sharing rules, a Nash-equilibrium theoretical game 
for two risk neutral economic agents is constructed.  Nash equilibrium is defined as “The 
strategy combination is a Nash-equilibrium if no player has incentive to deviate from his 
strategy given that the other players do not deviate” (Rasmusen 1989, 33).  The 
theoretical model represents interactions of two producers who are sharing a new set of 
machinery.  For ease in exposition, the machinery set to be shared is a harvesting set 
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(combines) by two independent agriculture producers.  Producer decision variables are 
the percentage of total shared costs paid by each producer and the machinery technology 
set to be purchased.  Shared costs include purchase and financing costs net of salvage 
value, maintenance costs, transportation costs, and transaction costs.  
Both producers, A and B, seek to maximize the expected present value of net 
returns, , where i is either producer A or B.  Both producers are assumed to be risk 
neutral.  It is assumed that once determined, the percentage of shared costs is constant 
throughout the life of the contract.  Further, it is assumed the firms enter into the 
machinery contract negotiations and base machinery sharing decisions on information 
and rules established ex ante, that is, before the actual sharing occurs.  Under these 
assumptions, producer i’s expected present value of net returns, , is     
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where  is defined as the expected present value of returns,  is the percentage of 
costs shared,  is the expected present value of shared costs,  is the expected 
present value of a penalty payment, and  is the expected present value of non-shared 
firm specific costs including all own transaction costs.  More specifically, the 
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where E is the expectations operator taken over weather conditions, T  is the total 
number of years in the planning horizon and t represents years,  are the returns 
associated with year t, 
i
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r  is the discount rate,  are the total shared costs in year t 
including shared transaction costs,  are the penalty payments or receipts in year t, 
and  are the non-shared firm specific costs in year t including non-shared transaction 
costs.  For simplicity, it is assumed that all prices are nonstochastic.   
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With this framework, the next step is to provide the arguments in the above 
functions.  It is assumed all shared costs must be paid by the two producers.  With this 
assumption  and .  It is assumed that once determined, αγ =A )1( αγ −=B α and the 
machinery technology set indicator, I, are fixed over the length of the contract.  These 
simplifying assumptions are not unreasonable; at the beginning of the contract the 
parties agree to fix the percent of shared costs and the machinery set for the life of the 
contract.   
The expected present value of returns, , is a function of 
output price, , condition of equipment, 
),,,,,,( iiiii wvrIazgR
ig z , acreage, , machinery technology set, I, 
discount rate, r, variable inputs, , and random weather, wi.  Machinery set selection 
affects returns because a larger capacity or more efficient machine allows for more 
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efficient harvesting operations.   The machinery set indicator, I, is assumed for 
mathematical ease to be a continuous variable that reflects changes in size and 
efficiency.  
The contract specifies that both parties will share a percentage of the total costs 
of ownership.  Shared costs include discounted cash flow payments of the machinery 
purchase and financing costs net of salvage value,  maintenance costs, 
, and yearly transportation costs associated with moving the machinery set 
between farms and transaction costs, .   is an increasing function of I; 
higher capacity and more efficient machinery sets have larger purchase prices.  Present 
value of machinery maintenance costs are a function of chosen machinery technology, I, 
discount rate, r, total acreage ( ), and the condition of the equipment, z.  It is 
assumed shared maintenance costs allow each producer to receive the machinery in good 
operating condition.   
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There is a period of time or window of opportunity for optimal harvesting of the 
crops.  Yields decrease when harvesting outside this window because weather and crop 
conditions begin to reduce crop yields and may eventually completely prevent harvest.  
Because of differences in location and variability in weather, harvesting windows for 
each producer may vary by year.  If the two producers live in the same region where 
weather conditions are similar, sharing machinery is very likely to lead to demand for 
the combines to occur at the same time.  As a result, one producer may face reduced 
yields because of untimeliness in harvesting.  The model accounts for windows of 
opportunity by including an expected penalty function, , which is a ),,,( ji wwrIPen
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function of machinery technology, the fixed discount rate, and random weather.  
Assuming producer A uses the equipment first, he must compensate producer B if 
machinery is not delivered at or before the contractual agreed time.  This leads to the 
relationship ; thus, the penalty is represented in the model by a 
single penalty function.  By delaying the delivery of the machinery from producer A to 
producer B, producer B may face reduced yields because of harvesting delays.  At the 
same time, producer A would face reduced returns if he delivered the machinery on time 
and did not complete harvesting operations.   
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Unshared firm specific costs, , are a function of input prices, , 
machinery technology employed, acreage harvested, and the discount rate.  Given that 
each producer independently operates shared machinery, any costs incurred that are not 
due to normal wear-and-tear become the responsibility of the producer who is operating 
the machine.  For example, producer B should not be responsible for repair or 
maintenance costs resulting from careless machinery operation by producer A or for fuel 
used by producer A. 
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Given these definitions, producer A’s problem is  
 
] .),,,
)],(),,,(),([),,,,max
,
raIPen
rITrazImrIPwvrIa
A
AiA
I
−
++−αα
   (3.6) 
Producer B’s problem is 
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 From producer A’s maximization problem it is evident that producer A can 
increase net returns if α is equal to 0, ceteris paribus; consequently paying none of the 
shared costs.  Similarly, producer B would have expected higher net returns if α equals 
1, where producer A pays all the shared costs and producer B pays none.  Given these 
two polar outcomes, there is obvious room for negotiation between the two firms.  This 
negotiation sets up the game theory component of the model.  The two producers must 
also decide on the machinery set, I, to be purchased.  Larger and more efficient 
machinery sets increase returns and decrease the amount of expected penalty that will be 
paid.  Shared costs, purchase costs, maintenance, and transportation costs, along with 
firm specific costs, however, increase as the machinery set is larger and more efficient.  
Again, trade-offs exist, as in general, each producers’ return and cost functions are 
different with respect to machinery set, I.  
 Economic theory suggest the following concerning the signs of the partial 
derivatives with respect to the machinery set ⎟⎟⎠
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that the signs of the aforementioned first partial derivatives are non-negative.  Second 
partial derivatives are assumed to be negative for returns, ⎟⎟⎠
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C i  .  As the size of the technology set increases 
returns would be expected to increase because of increased efficiency and timeliness in 
harvesting.  Returns, however, would increase at a decreasing rate.  Similarly, as the 
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machinery set increases, it is reasonable to assume that the purchase and financing costs, 
shared maintenance costs, and transportation costs also increase at an increasing rate.   
Nash Equilibrium 
 Producer A’s first order conditions (FOC) are 
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Whereas, producer B’s FOC are  
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Nash equilibrium involves the simultaneous solving of the FOC to determine both 
decision variables, α and I. 
The FOC conditions show two unique aspects of this problem.  There are four 
FOC but only two decision variables, α and I.  The problem is over-identified.  Over-
identification occurs because of the 1) sharing of the same machinery set and not 
determination of individual sets and 2) the realistic assumption that all costs are paid.  
The assumption of paying all the costs forces an exact relationship between the 
percentages of shared costs paid by the two producers.  Equations (3.8) and (3.10) 
indicate there is no bounded solution.  This arises because α enters both objective 
functions linearly.  A linear function obviously has no extreme points without some 
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constraint(s).  A necessary constraint is that α is in the economic relevant range of 0 to 1.  
Fortunately, the two FOC, equations (3.9) and (3.11), can be used to solve for α, to 
provide insights into optimal sharing rules, one objective of this study.  Unfortunately, 
an optimal I cannot be obtained using general equations.  
Optimal Shared Cost Percentages 
Solving equation (3.9) for α, provides producer A’s reaction function for the 
optimal percentage for sharing costs:    
I
T
I
m
I
P
I
C
I
Pen
I
R AA
∂
∂+∂
∂+∂
∂
∂
∂−∂
∂−∂
∂
=α .                              (3.12) 
If the machinery set selection is optimal, then the ratio of marginal net benefits of returns 
and costs not shared for producer A over marginal shared costs will be equal to the 
percentage of shared costs to be paid by producer A, equation (3.12).  Consistency with 
economic theory can be shown.  Economic theory suggests the optimal point of 
production for an individual firm is where marginal revenue equals marginal cost.  If the 
marginal revenue equals marginal cost, the numerator in equation (3.12) equals zero at 
which point α equals zero.  Consistent with previous observations, and economic theory, 
net returns are increased for producer A when producer A pays none of the shared costs, 
that is α equals zero. 
 Similarly, solving equation (3.11) for α provides producer B’s reaction function: 
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Producer B’s optimal decision results in the optimal percentage of shared costs being 
equal to one minus the ratio of marginal net benefits of non-shared returns and costs for 
producer B over marginal shared costs.  Similar to producer A’s reaction function, when 
marginal revenue is set equal to marginal costs, the numerator in the second part of 
equation (3.13) equals zero and α equals 1.  When α equals 1, producer B’s net returns 
increase because he pays none of the shared costs. 
 Setting equations (3.12) and (3.13) equal to each other and solving one obtains 
the Nash equilibrium for the percentage of shared costs:  
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The optimal or Nash equilibrium cost sharing percentage, α, is where the ratio of 
marginal net non-shared benefits over marginal shared costs of producer A equals 1 
minus the marginal net non-shared benefits over marginal costs for producer B.  The 
negative marginal net non-shared benefits over marginal costs for producer B indicates 
that cost sharing percentage cannot increase for both producers.  A feasible economic 
equilibrium is not obtained if the equilibrium is outside the range of 0 to 1; machinery 
sharing will not occur.  When the two curves do not cross in the economic feasible 
region, the outcome is a black hole or no economic equilibrium (Chang, Mjelde, and 
Ozuna 1998).  
All marginal shared costs in the denominator of equation (3.14) are positive, thus 
the denominators are positive.  As such, marginal shared costs alone cannot cause α to 
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be negative.  Further, marginal revenues are positive.  Therefore, it is the magnitudes of 
own marginal costs, ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂
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C i , and the marginal penalty cost, ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
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Pen , that can cause α to 
be negative, thereby deterring machinery sharing.  As an example of a black hole, 
consider producer A.  For producer A, marginal revenue cannot be smaller than the sum 
of the marginal own costs and the marginal penalty.  If marginal costs (own plus 
penalty) are larger, the optimal α becomes negative and no sharing occurs, a black hole.  
One potential cause of this particular black hole is own transaction costs.  Recall C, 
includes own transaction costs.  If own marginal transaction costs are large relative to 
the marginal returns, machinery sharing will not occur.  A similar argument can be made 
for producer B. 
Another example of a black hole is when own marginal costs are greater than 
marginal returns.  Here, own marginal cost of operating the larger more efficient 
machinery outweighs any increase in revenue.  In addition, machinery sharing does not 
occur when the marginal penalty costs are greater than marginal revenue minus marginal 
own costs.  The penalty function based on harvesting windows is important in 
determining if machinery sharing will occur.  A final example of when machinery 
sharing will not occur is when marginal shared costs are small (the denominator)  
relative to own marginal returns and costs (numerator).  In this case, the denominator is 
small relative to the numerator giving an optimal cost sharing percentage greater than 
one.    
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  If the two producers are homogenous in all aspects, the producers will equally 
pay shared costs.  This can be shown by simplifying equation (3.14) to:   
  DD −== 1α .                                  (3.15) 
The solution to equation (3.15) is α = 0.5 or 50%; each homogenous producer pays one-
half of the total shared costs.  This special case is the only case when producers equally 
share costs without knowledge of the specific functions. 
For heterogeneous producers, the percentage of total shared costs to be paid by 
each producer depends on the ratio of marginal own net benefits over marginal shared 
costs for each producer.  The equilibrium will generally not occur at α = 0.5.  The 
equilibrium point is dependent on the relative shapes of each producer’s curve.  If 
producer A realizes larger own marginal net benefits relative to marginal shared costs 
(larger ratio) than producer B, then producer A is willing to pay an additional percentage 
of the total shared costs to realize these additional benefits.  Consequently, the 
percentage of shared costs would increase for producer A and decrease for producer B.   
 One extreme case for heterogeneous producers is when the equilibrium is at α = 
1.  Producer A is willing to pay all shared costs when own marginal returns minus the 
sum of own marginal costs plus marginal penalty exactly equals the sum of the marginal 
shared costs.  As noted above, in this case producer B’s will be such that the marginal 
revenue is equal to the sum of the marginal penalty plus marginal own costs.  A similar 
argument can be made for the case α = 0, and producer B pays all shared costs. 
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Window of Opportunity 
The preceding discussion on the marginal penalty function illustrates the 
importance of the window of opportunity in machinery sharing.  Given our example of 
sharing harvesting machinery, three different scenarios exist when considering 
harvesting windows (Figure 3.2).  In the following discussion, the first timeline 
represents producer A, who uses the machinery first, and the second timeline represents 
producer B.  HS represents the expected start of harvest and HE the expected end of 
harvest.  The three scenarios are: 
1)  no overlap in the harvesting operations for the two producers, timeline 2 to 3, 
(timeline 2 represents producer A and timeline 3 represents producer B in this 
scenario); 
2)  complete overlap in harvesting operations (timelines 2 to 1, but not timelines 
1 to 2); and 
3)  partial overlap in harvesting operations (timelines 1 to 3). 
 
   The actual start of harvest for each year and producer is determined by weather 
conditions and location.  Further, weather conditions and location will determine when 
producer A finishes harvesting and can deliver the machinery to producer B.  If producer 
A is unable to deliver the machinery set to producer B by the time specified in the 
contract, then producer A must compensate producer B.  Two important factors in 
determining this penalty are the windows of harvesting opportunity overlap and the form 
of the penalty function. 
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P HS 
Timeline 2 
Timeline 1 
HE time 
P HS HE time 
Timeline 3 
 
HE P HS time 
 
Figure 3.2  Three planting and harvesting timelines where P represents planting 
date, HS is harvesting start date, HE is harvesting end date, and time is the 
continuous planning horizon for one season 
 
If there is no overlap in harvesting windows (scenario one), producer A will 
always complete harvesting before producer B needs the machinery.  In this scenario, no 
penalty is necessary as timely delivery of the machinery always occurs.  It is assumed 
that producer A does not deliver the machinery in a timely fashion only because his/her 
harvest is not yet finished.  This is the simplest case, but the two producers will, in 
general, be separated by a large distance increasing transaction and transportation costs. 
In the scenarios where there is either a partial (timeline 1 to 3) or complete 
(timeline 2 to 1) overlap in expected harvesting windows, the penalty function becomes 
an important component in machinery sharing.  In the years where the machinery set is 
delivered before or at the specified date, producer A pays no penalty payment to 
producer B.  However, in the years where weather is such that producer A does not 
finish harvest until after the specified calendar date; a penalty is paid to producer B.  
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Because the contract is determined ex-ante or before the weather occurs, development of 
the penalty is based on expected weather conditions.  The expected penalty payment is 
driven by harvesting timeliness which is affected by the machinery set.  A larger 
machinery set allows for a more efficient and timely harvest, and decreases the overlap.  
Transportation and maintenance costs, however, are a function of the size of the 
machinery set.  Producers can not decrease the expected penalty to be paid without 
increasing these costs.  In addition, expected returns are an increasing function of I but at 
a decreasing rate. 
Penalty a Function of Machinery Set Only 
Here, the penalty is only a function of the machinery set.  If producer A delivers 
the machinery on or before the contractual date, no penalty is paid.  On those years 
weather does not allow for timely delivery and producer A fails to deliver the machinery 
set by the agreed contractual date, producer A pays a fixed amount to producer B.  This 
amount is a function of the machinery set chosen.  As assumed in the model 
development, a larger more efficient machinery set is associated with smaller penalty 
payments, 0
I
Pen ≤⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂ .  Once the machinery set is chosen, this penalty function is easy 
to implement, but very inflexible.  No incentives are provided to producer A to deliver 
the machinery set once the delivery date has been missed.  Advantages of this penalty 
function are smaller transactions costs and information requirements. 
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Penalty a Function of Machinery Set and Delivery Date   
To overcome the lack of incentives provided by a penalty function being only 
dependent on the machinery set, the penalty function could be based on the time that 
machinery is delivered beyond the specified date.  Here, delivery time past the contract 
date, k, is included in the penalty function, .  The expected 
marginal penalty in equation (3.14) becomes
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developing the model was that the expected marginal penalty decreases with increases in 
machinery set.  The sign of the marginal penalty value with respect to time, ⎟⎠
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Pen , is 
positive; as more time lapses, the penalty paid by producer A to producer B increases to 
compensate producer B for reduced yields caused by untimely delivery.  As the 
machinery set increases, delivery time is expected to be closer to the time specified in 
the contract because harvesting is more efficient and timely.  Therefore, the sign of 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
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I
k is negative.  Including delivery time from the contract date addresses the lack of 
incentives for producer A to deliver the machinery once the delivery date has been 
missed.  Information requirements and transactions costs, however, are higher when 
considering timely delivery than they were in the first case. 
Penalty a Function of Machinery Set, Delivery Date, and Returns 
Producers are more interested in how returns are affected by delayed machinery 
delivery than the actual date of delivery.  Rewriting the penalty as a function of returns 
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one obtains .  The expected 
marginal penalty in equation (3.14) becomes 
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Recall, the assumption is that the marginal penalty with respect to machinery set is non-
positive, ⎟⎟⎠
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Pen .  For this assumption to hold regardless of magnitudes, the 
following must hold.  From the above discussion it was shown ⎟⎠
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k .  Producer A’s 
marginal returns with respect to the delivery date is nonnegative; because of penalty 
costs, a producer will only delay delivery of the machinery if the delay increases his/her 
returns, .0
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∂   Therefore, for the first three terms in the marginal penalty function 
to be negative, the marginal penalty with respect to producers A’s returns must be non-
negative, ⎟⎟⎠
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Pen .  For last three terms to be negative, the marginal penalty with 
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With this penalty function, producers are concerned with how returns change 
based on untimely machinery delivery and how the penalty changes based on changes in 
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returns generated from untimely machinery delivery.  These changes are represented by 
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B for producer B.  It should be noted that 
this penalty function is not profit sharing because producer B is only compensated for 
additional returns gained by producer A after the delivery time has expired and not 
producer A’s total returns.  Consider producer B.  If producer B’s returns are not 
affected by untimely delivery of the machinery, then no penalty should be paid based on 
this component.  Under this assumption, 0
k
R B =⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂ , producer B’s component (last three 
terms in equation (3.16)) goes to zero.  A similar argument can be made for producer A.  
Intuitively pleasing, is the result if neither producers’ returns are impacted by untimely 
delivery, the penalty function becomes irrelevant in determining the optimal cost sharing 
percentages.  Relative to the previous two penalty functions, larger information 
requirements and transaction costs are associated with the penalty being a function of 
returns, along with machinery set and delivery date. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 Ad hoc information suggests that machinery sharing may be a viable strategy for 
agribusiness managers to improve firm’s performance by reducing total capital 
investment, risk management, and providing firms access to higher quality, capacity 
and/or additional machines.  Few studies to date have considered the economics of 
machinery sharing.  This model is a step towards addressing this void in the literature.  
Rather than look at the question of share or do not share machinery, this chapter looked 
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at the question from the standpoint that the decision to share had already been made.  
Contractual issues associated with sharing machinery between two producers are 
discussed using a theoretical game theory model. 
 The Nash equilibrium indicates the optimal percentage of shared costs is 
determined by the ratio of marginal own net benefits over the marginal shared costs.  
Several factors can cause there to be no equilibrium (black hole), where no machinery 
sharing will occur.  One potential cause of black holes is transaction costs.  Machinery 
sharing is not optimal when own marginal transaction costs are large, driving marginal 
net benefits to be negative.  Own transaction costs are idiosyncratic, affected by a firms’ 
internal organization, strategies, resources, objectives, and all unique firm attributes.  
More efficient firms that are able to utilize their own unique capabilities and resources to 
reduce own transaction costs are more likely to share machinery.  Another potential 
cause of black holes is when marginal shared costs are small relative to own marginal 
net returns.  If at the margin there is little cost savings, machinery sharing is less likely to 
occur. 
 The model also illustrates the importance of windows of opportunity in the use of 
shared machinery.  If one producer does not deliver the machinery to the other producer 
in a timely fashion, a penalty may be paid between the producers.  The penalty function 
can take on different forms ranging from very simple to more complex forms.  As the 
complexity is increased, transaction costs and informational requirements increase 
leading to the potential for less machinery sharing.  If transaction costs are too high and 
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explicit functional forms and/or information is too cumbersome to obtain, a simpler rule 
based on acreage in production may be warranted. 
 Unique to this general model set up was the linear nature of the percentage of 
shared costs and the over identification of the model because of a single machinery set 
and the assumption of all costs being paid.  Given net return maximization, the 
percentage of shared costs enters the model linearly.  From society’s viewpoint, any 
percentage of shared costs may be Pareto Optimal.  Further model development is 
necessary including considering other ways to include sharing of costs.  Including risk 
attitudes by maximizing utility instead of net returns will force the percentage to enter 
the model nonlinearly.  General functional forms cannot be used in this case, specific 
forms will have to be assumed.  Given the lumpy aspects of machinery purchases, 
quadratic programming or simulation modeling should be considered when using 
specific functional forms.  Another important non-continuous aspect ignored in the 
model is taxes.  Producers may be able to share tax deductions by sharing machinery. 
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CHAPTER IV 
YIELD AND HARVEST WINDOW SIMULATIONS 
 
Two important components in the machinery sharing simulation model are wheat 
yields and harvest windows.  A biophysical wheat growth simulation model is used to 
obtain yields and maturity dates.  As noted in the literature review, the use of growth 
simulation models to generate crop yields is becoming an increasingly common 
procedure (Lawless and Semenov 2005; Basso et al. 2007; Savin et al. 1995; Pecetti and 
Hollington 1997).  Decision Support System for Agrotechnology Transfer (DSSATv4 
2004) is used to simulate wheat yields and to obtain maturity dates for four farm 
locations.  Simulated and county historical wheat yields are compared to calibrate 
DSSATv4.  The effects of outlier observations for yields on the performance of the 
model are examined. 
Four farm locations are simulated: 1) Dumas in Moore County, Texas; 2) Pampa 
in Gray County, Texas; 3) Akron in Washington County, Colorado; and 4) Big Sandy in 
Chouteau County, Montana.  One of the main considerations in determining the 
locations is harvesting windows.  Locations for the farms are selected such that 
harvesting windows have partial, complete, and very little overlap among the farms.  
Another consideration is availability of other data necessary for both the crop growth 
simulation and the machinery sharing simulation models.  Generally in this dissertation, 
the town names are used to refer to the farm locations.    
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  Fifty-one crop growing seasons are simulated for each location to obtain a 
distribution of wheat yields and maturity dates.  Harvesting windows are determined 
from the simulated maturity dates.  Wheat yields decrease after the maturity date has 
been reached.  Unfortunately, DSSATv4 only provides crop yield at maturity date.  
Discussion of harvesting windows and yield reductions after maturity date are presented 
in Chapter V. 
Crop Simulation Requirements 
DSSATv4 is a process-oriented, management level model designed to simulate 
soil water and nitrogen balances for wheat plant growth (DSSATv4 2004).  Data 
requirements for the crop simulation model are divided into four categories: variety-
specific genetic characteristics, soil, weather, and other inputs including other 
management decisions. 
Variety 
The dominant class of wheat grown in the region of each location is modeled.  
U.S. winter wheat is the dominant cultivar used in the Texas and Colorado locations, 
while spring wheat is the cultivar used in Montana.  Winter wheat production is 
estimated at 140.6 million bushels in Texas (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2007a) and 
soft winter wheat varieties accounted for 7.9 percent of total planted wheat acreage in 
2000 (Texas Agricultural Statistics Service 2007).  Although soft red winter wheat 
(SRWW) cultivars are often recommended as the type of wheat to grow in Texas (Reid 
and Swart 2006), hard winter wheat is the dominant class of wheat produced, accounting 
for 85.7 percent of the planted wheat acreage in Texas (Texas Agricultural Statistics 
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Service 2007).  SRWW is recommended over hard red winter wheat (HRWW) cultivars 
because of rust resistance, straw strength, and 15 bushel per acre yield advantages over 
HRWW.  The DSSATv4 cultivar, Winter-US, is modeled for the Texas and Colorado 
farm locations, which is a HRWW.  In Colorado, HRWW is the most suitable variety for 
weather conditions under dryland production (Johnson and Haley 2006).  Hard winter 
(red and white) wheat is the dominant class of wheat produced in Colorado, accounting 
for more than 95 percent of the total wheat grown (Colorado Wheat 2007).  Over 97 
percent of the hard red spring wheat grown in Montana is on dryland acreage with spring 
wheat acreage comprising approximately 47 percent of total wheat acreage in 2007 
(Lanning et al. 2008).  The DSSATv4 cultivar, Spring-High Latitude, is modeled for the 
Montana farm location. 
Soil 
Representative soil characteristics from Natural Resources Conservation Service 
online county soil surveys for each of the locations are used (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture 2007b).  Soil properties including bulk density, drained upper and lower 
water limits, saturation water content, organic matter content, and volumetric soil water 
content are required inputs.  The soil type with the highest prevalence rate within each 
county is selected.  For Moore County (Dumas location), Sherm silty clay loam is the 
predominant soil type comprising 45.6% of the county.  Pullman clay loam, a silty clay 
loam, comprising 24.9% of the county is the predominant soil type in Gray County 
(Pampa).  Weld silt loam is the predominant soil type in Washington County (Akron) 
with a 16.9% prevalence rate.  Telstad-Joplin Loams are the predominant soil type in  
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Table 4.1  Description of Soil Conditions and Parameters 
  Akron Dumas Pampa Big Sandy 
Soil Classification Weld Silt 
Loam 
Silty Clay 
Loam 
Silty Clay 
Loam 
Telstad-
Joplin 
Color Brown Black Black Brown 
Drainage 
Well 
Moderately 
Well 
Moderately 
Well Well 
% Slope 3 3 3 1 
Runoff Potential Moderately 
Low 
Moderately 
High 
Moderately 
High Lowest 
Fertility Factor 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Latitude 40.1 35.5 35.5 48.1 
Longitude -103.1 -101.6 -100.6 -110.0 
Elevation (m) 1384.8 1114.0 985.1 844.3 
Initial Conditions  
Water % Available 70.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 
Nitrogen (kg/ha) 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Source:  Adopted from the National Climatic Data Center (U.S. Department of 
Commerce 2008) and from the Natural Resources Conservation Service online 
county soil surveys  (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2007b). 
 
 
 
Chouteau County (Big Sandy) with a 7.4% prevalence rate.  Characteristics of each soil 
type and initial soil conditions following a fallow year used in the crop 
simulation model are presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.  All other soil parameters specified 
in the model are set to DSSATv4 default values.      
Weather 
Daily weather data for 52 years, 1955 to 2006, are obtained from the National 
Climatic Data Center (U.S. Department of Commerce 2008).  Weather data requirements 
include daily precipitation, maximum daily temperature, minimum daily temperature, 
and daily solar radiation.  Solar radiation is not available for these years; therefore, the 
solar radiation generator data DSSATv4 is used.  Daily weather data are used to simulate  
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Table 4.2. Soil Parameters Specified within the DSSAT1 Model 
Depth  
Organic 
Carbon 
Lower 
Limit 
Drained 
Upper 
Limit Saturation
Bulk 
Density
Saturated 
Hydraulic 
Conductivity 
Root 
Growth 
Factor 
(cm) (%) (cm3) (cm3) (%) (g/cm3) (cm/h) (0 to 1) 
Akron 
5 1.00 0.02 0.18 0.18 1.15 0.92 1.00 
15 1.00 0.02 0.18 0.18 1.15 0.92 1.00 
30 1.00 0.02 0.18 0.18 1.15 0.92 0.60 
60 0.50 0.02 0.17 0.17 1.25 0.92 0.25 
90 0.50 0.02 0.17 0.17 1.25 0.92 0.15 
120 0.20 0.02 0.16 0.16 1.25 0.92 0.05 
150 0.20 0.01 0.15 0.15 1.25 0.92 0.00 
180 0.20 0.00 0.15 0.15 1.25 0.92 0.00 
Dumas 
5 1.00 0.14 0.30 0.31 1.25 0.92 1.00 
15 1.00 0.14 0.30 0.31 1.25 0.92 1.00 
30 0.10 0.14 0.27 0.27 1.35 0.92 0.60 
60 0.10 0.12 0.25 0.25 1.35 0.92 0.25 
90 0.10 0.12 0.25 0.25 1.35 0.92 0.15 
120 0.10 0.12 0.25 0.25 1.35 0.92 0.05 
150 0.10 0.04 0.17 0.14 1.35 0.92 0.00 
180 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.11 1.35 0.92 0.00 
Pampa 
5 1.00 0.14 0.30 0.31 1.25 0.92 1.00 
15 1.00 0.14 0.30 0.31 1.25 0.92 1.00 
30 0.10 0.14 0.27 0.27 1.35 0.92 0.60 
60 0.10 0.12 0.25 0.25 1.35 0.92 0.25 
90 0.10 0.12 0.25 0.25 1.35 0.92 0.15 
120 0.10 0.12 0.25 0.25 1.35 0.92 0.05 
150 0.10 0.04 0.17 0.14 1.35 0.92 0.00 
180 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.11 1.35 0.92 0.00 
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Table 4.2 Continued 
Depth  
Organic 
Carbon 
Lower 
Limit 
Drained 
Upper 
Limit Saturation
Bulk 
Density
Saturated 
Hydraulic 
Conductivity 
Root 
Growth 
Factor 
(cm) (%) (cm3) (cm3) (%) (g/cm3) (cm/h) (0 to 1) 
Big Sandy 
5 3.00 0.30 0.50 0.60 1.35 14.00 1.00 
15 3.00 0.30 0.50 0.60 1.35 14.00 1.00 
30 2.00 0.30 0.48 0.55 1.45 4.00 0.60 
60 1.00 0.30 0.48 0.55 1.50 4.00 0.25 
90 1.00 0.30 0.48 0.55 1.50 4.00 0.15 
120 1.00 0.30 0.47 0.55 1.75 1.40 0.05 
150 0.50 0.30 0.47 0.55 1.75 1.40 0.00 
180 0.50 0.30 0.47 0.55 1.75 1.40 0.00 
1DSSAT, Decision Support System for Agrotechnology Transfer, is the crop simulation           
  model computer software (DSSATv4 2004). 
 
 
 
crop growth and development for a given year to capture the effects of climate  
 
variability on crop growth. 
 
Because winter wheat is planted in the fall and harvested the following year, 52 
years of weather data are needed to simulate the 51 cropping years.  Only 52 years of 
weather is used because beyond that time weather data for some of the stations have 
many missing observations.  A principle weather station in the county of each farm 
location is chosen and surrounding weather stations are used to fill in missing data.  The 
principle weather stations for the four farm locations are the Dumas, Pampa, Big Sandy, 
and Akron 4 E weather stations.  Surrounding weather stations used to fill in missing 
observations are Channing 11NE, Sunray 4 SW, Alanreed, Havre, and Akron.  Weather 
Underground, an online weather source, is also used to fill in missing weather data 
(Weather Underground 2007). 
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Table 4.3  Management Parameters for Each Farm Location 
  Akron Dumas Pampa Big Sandy 
Previous Crop Fallow Fallow Fallow Fallow 
Cultivar Winter 
Wheat 
Winter 
Wheat 
Winter 
Wheat 
Spring 
Wheat 
Planting Date 15-Sep 1-Sep 1-Sep 10-Apr 
Planting Method Dry Seed Dry Seed Dry Seed Dry Seed 
Row Spacing (cm)  16 16 16 16 
Plant Population at Seeding 
(plants/m2) 162 162 162 200 
Plant Population at 
Emergence (plants/m2) 162 162 162 200 
Planting Depth 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 
Fertilizer on the Seed 5cm 
Deep (N,kg/ha) 30 100 70 200 
Tillage Drill Depth (cm) 6 6 6 6 
 
 
   
Other Inputs 
Other input data such as management decisions on nitrogen rate, seeding density, 
and tillage are determined from state extension publications and set to recommended 
levels for the four locations.  Planting dates are set within historical ranges (U.S. 
Department of Agriculture 1972).  Management decisions are summarized in Table 4.3.  
County Historical and Simulated Yields 
Simulated wheat yields are compared to county historical wheat yields to 
calibrate DSSATv4.  Because simulated yields are calibrated to county historical yields, 
yield loss due to disease, spillage, and pests are implicitly accounted for in the crop 
growth simulation model.  County yield data are used because they are the most 
consistent available data for the four farm locations.  Not all counties, however, have 
reported historical yields for the years 1956 to 2006.  County yields represent the 
average of all management practices and soil types in the county.  In addition, trends are 
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expected in the historical wheat yields, because of advances in genetics and technology. 
Washington County (Akron) shows a statistically significant trend for historical yield 
data from 1956 to 2003 (p-value < 0.09) associated with the coefficient for year in Table 
4.4).  Trend in Moore County (Dumas) is weakly statistically significant (p-value < 
0.18).  Gray (Pampa) and Chouteau (Big Sandy) counties show no significant trend 
when using available historical data from 1956 to 2006.  All available county historical 
data and final simulated yields are presented in Figures 4.1 through 4.4. 
Trends in simulated yields are only weakly statistically significant for 
Washington County (Akron) for years 1956 to 2003 (p-value < 0.17) and years 1990 to 
2003 (p-value < 0.19).  The trend in simulated yields for Washington County is most 
likely explained by changes in the weather data, including differences in how weather 
data is collected, measurement errors, data handling inconsistencies, and/or a trend in the 
weather.    
Because of advances in genetics, technology and accuracy of statistical reporting, 
and evidence of trends in county historical yields, this study will compare historical and 
simulated yields from 1990 to 2006.  No or statistically weak trends for county historical 
and simulated yields are present when considering yield data from 1990 to 2006 for 
Moore, Gray, and Chouteau counties (see Table 4.4). A strong statistical trend, however, 
is present in county historical yield data for Washington County (p-value < 0.00).  
Simulated yield values mimic the historical yield patterns for most years in 
Dumas except for one year, 1999 (Figure 4.1).  During 1999, Dumas historical yield is 
49.5 bu/acre and the corresponding simulated yield is 20.72 bu/acre.  Historical and 
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Table 4.4 Trends1 for Historical and Simulated Wheat Yields 
  Moore Gray Washington Chouteau
Historical2 
Years with Data 1973-2006 1973-2006 1956-2003 1956-2006
Constant -412.21 -202.93 692.87 337.50
Standard Error 313.34 259.37 375.22 290.79
p-Value 0.20 0.44 0.07 0.25
Year 0.22 0.11 -0.33 -0.16
Standard Error 0.16 0.13 0.19 0.15
p-Value 0.18 0.40 0.09 0.29
R-Squared 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.03
Simulated3 
Constant 194.20 61.61 607.35 -77.55
Standard Error 257.59 165.48 402.25 324.08
p-Value 0.46 0.71 0.14 0.81
Year -0.08 -0.02 -2.87 0.05
Standard Error  0.13 0.08 0.20 0.16
p-Value 0.52 0.83 0.17 0.76
R-Squared 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.00
Historical2 
Years with Data 1990-2006 1990-2006 1990-2003 1990-2006
Constant 1100.91 184.46 3731.71 1229.85
Standard Error 993.37 848.79 1041.34 837.83
p-Value 0.29 0.83 0.00 0.16
Year -0.54 -0.08 -1.85 -0.60
Standard Error 0.50 0.42 0.52 0.42
p-Value 0.30 0.85 0.00 0.17
R-Squared 0.07 0.00 0.46 0.12
Simulated3 
Constant -551.81 -273.26 1573.85 727.04
Standard Error 579.95 415.47 1114.08 864.64
p-Value 0.36 0.52 0.18 0.41
Year 0.29 0.15 -0.77 -0.35
Standard Error 0.29 0.21 0.56 0.43
p-Value 0.33 0.48 0.19 0.43
R-Squared 0.06 0.03 0.11 0.04
1Trends are tested using the equation Yieldt = α + βYeart + εt where Yieldt are   
historical county or simulated yields. 
2Historical values are calculated using all available data for a specified range of years. 
3Simulated values are calculated using only years with corresponding historical data. 
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Figure 4.1  Dumas winter wheat historical county and simulated yields  
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Figure 4.2  Pampa winter wheat historical county and simulated yields  
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Figure 4.3  Akron winter wheat historical county and simulated yields 
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Figure 4.4  Big Sandy spring wheat historical county and simulated yields 
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simulated yield patterns are similar in Pampa except for three years (1994, 1995, and 
1996) where county historical yields are lower than simulated yields (Figure 4.2).  
Lowest simulated yields in Akron correspond to three years (1963, 1976, and 1996) of 
low historical wheat yields; however, simulated yields for two years (1996 and 1997) are 
extremely low compared to county historical yields (Figure 4.3).  Big Sandy historical 
and simulated wheat yields are highly correlated except from 1980 to 1983 where 
historical yields are high and simulated yields are low (Figure 4.4). 
Calibrating DSSATv4 was done by altering initial soil moisture and daily 
temperatures as suggested by the model developers.  Final initial soil moisture levels 
used are given in Table 4.1.  Because of extremely low temperatures in Akron, simulated 
wheat yields were initially zero for four years (1984, 1989, 1990, and 1991).  As 
recommended by one of the developers of DSSATv4, the minimum temperature was 
raised to deter plant winter-kill (Hoogenboom 2008).  Wheat that is exposed to extreme 
cold temperatures for prolonged periods of time and lack of snow cover are the primary 
reasons for winter kill (Fausey et al. 1999).  The model accounts for winter-kill 
associated with low temperatures, but does not account for snow cover.  Complete 
winter-kill was eliminated when minimum and maximum temperatures were raised up to 
20 degrees for 12 days in December 1983, 3 days in January 1984, 8 days in February 
1989, 9 days in December 1989, and 5 days in December 1990.   
County historical mean yields are 23.07, 20.41, 32.89, and 25.18 bu/acre, when 
using available data from years 1990 to 2006 for Moore, Gray, Washington, and 
Chouteau Counties (Table 4.5).  Simulated mean yields for the years 1990 to 2006 are  
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Table 4.5. Summary Statistics of Historical and Simulated Wheat 
Yields Using Available Data 
  Dumas Pampa Akron Big Sandy 
Historical 
Mean 20.77 18.79 28.15 24.19 
Variance 9.13 7.32 8.50 7.73 
Minimum 6.00 38.95 30.20 31.96 
Median 19.30 7.50 7.50 10.00 
Maximum 49.50 18.00 29.25 24.00 
Skewness 0.99 33.30 44.50 42.00 
Kurtosis 1.72 0.33 -0.21 0.32 
Years 1956-2006 1956-2006 1956-2006 1956-2006 
Simulated 
Mean 27.73 24.55 36.15 20.36 
Variance 7.66 4.76 12.19 8.68 
Minimum 13.80 12.24 3.82 3.38 
Median 26.82 24.82 39.71 19.59 
Maximum 51.83 39.96 55.86 38.55 
Skewness 0.83 0.47 -0.61 0.12 
Kurtosis 1.07 1.44 -0.06 -0.36 
Years 1956-2006 1956-2006 1956-2006 1956-2006 
Historical 
Mean 23.07 20.41 32.89 25.18 
Variance 10.10 8.32 5.49 8.75 
Minimum 6.00 8.20 21.50 10.00 
Median 19.30 7.50 7.50 10.00 
Maximum 49.50 18.00 29.25 24.00 
Skewness 0.99 33.30 44.50 42.00 
Kurtosis 1.72 0.33 -0.21 0.32 
Years 1990-2006 1990-2006 1990-2006 1990-2006 
Simulated 
Mean 26.63 24.92 34.46 24.80 
Variance 5.86 4.14 11.58 8.65 
Minimum 17.95 19.08 8.08 8.40 
Median 25.42 24.88 36.88 26.31 
Maximum 36.47 33.58 49.48 38.55 
Skewness 0.32 0.23 -0.70 -0.15 
Kurtosis -1.18 -0.45 0.03 -0.82 
Years 1990-2006 1990-2006 1990-2006 1990-2006 
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Table 4.5 Continued 
  Dumas Pampa Akron Big Sandy 
Mean Test Using Available Data from 1990 to 2006 
2 Sample t Test -1.26 -2.00 -0.49 0.13 
p-Value 0.22 0.06 0.63 0.90 
Variance Test Using Available Data from 1990 to 2006 
F-test 2.97 4.04 4.45 1.02 
p-Value 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.48 
1Distribution comparison tests are based on all available historical 
data and corresponding simulated data for specified range of years. 
 
 
 
26.63, 24.92, 34.46, and 24.80 bu/acre for Dumas, Pampa, Akron, and Big Sandy.  Mean 
values of both historical and simulated wheat yields from 1990 to 2006 are statistically 
equal for all locations at the 95 percent confidence level (Table 4.5).  Except for Big 
Sandy, the variances are not statistically equal at the 95 percent confidence level (Table 
4.5).  The hypothesis tests, two-sample Student-t test of Univariate Means and F-test of 
Univariate Variances, used in Simetar© to test means and variances, are individual tests.  
A description and interpretation of the tests is provided in Richardson (2006). 
Bartlett-Adjusted Test 
As another verification test of the calibrated crop simulation model, a newly 
developed test statistic called the Bartlett-adjusted likelihood ratio-based statistic test, 
(TB), (Abdulsalam et al. 2008) is used to jointly test means and variances.  This 
statistical test uses the measurement error model framework to verify simulation models.  
A common procedure to verify is to regress simulated yield on historical values.   The 
joint null hypothesis of a zero intercept and unit slope is tested using an F-test with an 
overall hypothesis of H0: β0 = 0, β1 = 1 (White et al. 2007).  F-test results are given in 
Table 4.5.  This method is invalid because of correlation between the error term and 
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dependent variable which corresponds to inconsistent estimates of the intercept and 
slope parameters.  Abdulsalam et al. (2008) cite additional authors who critique the use 
of this F-test and offer an alternative, the Bartlett-adjusted test statistic (TB). 
The null hypothesis remains the same for this adjusted statistic, which is 
approximately distributed as a chi-square distribution with two degrees of freedom 
(Abdulsalam 1996; Abdulsalam et al. 2008).  Equations used to calculate TB are 
(Abdulsalam et al. 2008): 
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where S is the corrected sum of squares and cross product matrix defined by test 
statistic ,Z   is a linear measurement error model,tZ X  is the simulated mean, Y is the 
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historical mean, n is the number of observations,  is the maximum likelihood estimator 
of the slope parameter, , ,  
1βˆ
T 1Ta )1,1( −= a )1,ˆ(ˆ 1 −= β naˆ− is the Bartlett adjustment 
factor, andφ  and are used to calculate 2σˆ naˆ1− .  
Bartlett-adjusted test statistic results for all locations are given in Table 4.6.  
When historical county and simulated years from 1990 to 2006 are considered 
separately, the Bartlett-adjusted test indicates that only Pampa and Akron are statistically 
different from the null hypothesis.  However, when all locations are tested jointly using 
data from years 1990 to 2006, the Bartlett-adjusted test indicates all locations are not 
statistically different from the null hypothesis.   
As noted earlier, simulated yields mimic county historical yield patterns for all 
locations except for a few years.  To test the importance of these years on the Bartlett 
statistic for Akron and Pampa, the simulated yields for some years are replaced with 
their means.  A closer inspection of Figure 4.2 shows historical county yields for three 
years in Pampa (1994, 1995, and 1996) are very low compared to simulated yields.  
Similarly, Figure 4.3 shows simulated yields for two years in Akron (1996, 1997) are 
extremely low when compared to historical county yields.  Minimum temperatures were 
extremely low in 1996 and 1997 during part of the winter in Akron, which resulted in 
DSSATv4 giving simulated yields that are much lower than historical county yields for 
these two years.  Low historical county yields in northern Texas from 1994 to 1996 may  
be attributed to erratic weather patterns, a dry spring in 1995 and severe Greenbug 
infestation (Texas Agricultural Extension Service 1995).  Greenbug, Schizaphis 
graminum Rondani, is an aphid and pest that feeds on grain crops.  Because pest and 
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Table 4.6 Bartlett Test Statistics for Each Farm Location 
 Dumas Pampa Akron Big Sandy All
 1956-2006 
Bartlett Test Statistic 2.63 20.21 23.71 6.70 26.08
p-Value 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00
 1990-2006 
Bartlett Test Statistic 2.14 8.19 11.24 4.87 1.97
p-Value 0.34 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.37
 Data Adjusted1 1990-2006 
Bartlett Test Statistic 2.14 3.19 5.83 0.06 2.12
p-Value 0.34 0.20 0.05 0.97 0.35
1Two years in Colorado and three years in Pampa, TX were adjusted to the mean      
  values. 
 
 
 
disease treatments are not included in the simulation model, simulated yields from 1994 
to 1996 do not account for the reduction in yields due to Greenbug infestations.  
Historical county yields, therefore, are expected to be lower than simulated yields.         
When historical yields for these years for Pampa and simulated yields for Akron 
are adjusted to the mean values, Bartlett-adjusted test statistics fails to reject the null 
hypothesis at the 95 percent confidence level for all locations (Table 4.6).  This indicates 
these few years contribute to the null hypothesis being rejected earlier.  Given that 
historical county and simulated yield means and variances are not statistically different 
from each other for all locations as given by the Bartlett-adjusted test statistic, the wheat 
growth model provides reliable simulated wheat yields.  
Maturity Date Distributions 
In addition to wheat yields, wheat grain maturity date is also obtained for each 
year from DSSATv4.  The distributions of simulated wheat grain maturity dates are  
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Table 4.7  Descriptive Statistics for Simulated Maturity Dates 
in Gregorian Date 
 Dumas Pampa Akron Big Sandy
Mean 148 144 181 195
Standard Deviation 8 9 6 6
Maximum 165 159 193 210
Minimum 130 125 167 180
  Note:  Gregorian Date is a continuous count of days within one year. 
 
 
 
given in Figure 4.5, while the summary statistics on the first day of maturity are 
presented in Table 4.7.  
The maturity date is distinct from the beginning harvesting date.  The two dates 
are related in that the maturity date determines the beginning harvesting date and the 
beginning harvesting date is one component that determines the harvesting window.  
Wheat is not ready to be harvested at the simulated maturity date because of high grain 
kernel moisture levels; harvesting begins after the maturity date.  The length of the 
actual harvesting window depends on the beginning harvesting date, as well as, the 
speed of the harvesting equipment (assuming the machinery is at the place of harvest and 
ready to operate), weather, and wheat acreage.  Almost complete overlap of wheat 
maturity dates for Pampa and Dumas would indicate that beginning harvest dates almost 
completely overlap; therefore, harvesting windows will almost completely overlap for 
these two locations.   
In cases where simulated wheat maturity dates have partial or no overlap, 
harvesting windows may still overlap.  For example, the Texas farm locations have 
almost no wheat maturity date overlap with the Akron farm location, but harvesting 
windows will overlap because of the amount of time necessary to complete harvesting.  
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If machinery is shared, additional time is necessary to account for transportation of 
machinery from one farm to the other.  When maturity dates partially overlap as in the 
case of Akron and Big Sandy, harvesting windows will overlap.  Additional discussion 
of the harvesting windows is provided in Chapter V of the dissertation where it is 
incorporated into the farm simulation model.
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Figure 4.5  Maturity date distributions in Gregorian Date for a) Dumas, b) Pampa, c) Akron, and d) Big Sandy 
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CHAPTER V 
MACHINERY SHARING SIMULATION MODEL 
 
A discrete, stochastic, multi-year simulation model, which calculates costs, 
returns, taxes, and net present value (NPV) of after tax cash flows, is developed for the 
four wheat farm locations.  The four wheat farm locations described in Chapter IV, 
Dumas, Pampa, Akron, and Big Sandy, are modeled with stochastic prices, crop yields, 
and harvesting windows.  Costs and returns normally included in a farm simulation 
model are present, but because of machinery sharing the model has several unique 
aspects.   
Two farms are simultaneously simulated.  The machinery shared is two combine 
harvesters, referred to throughout this chapter as shared machinery or harvesting 
machinery.  One potential cost of sharing machinery is the possibility that the harvest 
machinery will not be available at the optimal time for both farms.  There is a period of 
time or window of opportunity for optimal harvesting of crops.  If the two producers live 
in the same region where weather conditions are similar, sharing machinery is likely to 
lead to demand for harvesting machinery at the same time.  As a result, one producer 
may face reduced yields because of a delay in harvesting.  If the farms are 
geographically diverse, the harvest windows for the two farms may either partially 
overlap or have no overlap.  Because of variability in weather, harvesting windows for 
each farm vary not only by farm but also by crop year.  Transportation costs increase, 
however, as producers are more geographically dispersed.  Contractual arrangements, 
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such as the percentage of shared costs (which among other issues has tax implications) 
and penalties associated with delays in harvest are also included.  The contract is 
assumed to allow 25 consecutive days of harvesting plus travel time without penalty.   
All four farms are 10,000 acre wheat farms using a wheat-fallow rotation.  In any 
given year 5,000 acres, therefore, are in production.  All farms are the same size to 
eliminate size of farm impacts and to allow isolation of machinery sharing effects.  In 
addition, each farm has a homestead consisting of five non-farmable acres where a house 
and buildings reside.  It is assumed that the house, buildings, and five acres are owned 
debt free.  The model is developed such that the financial and contractual structure of the 
farms including land values, percentage of owned land, and percentage of owned non-
shared machinery, can easily be varied.  A description of each farm with the 
accompanying machinery required for each farm is presented in Table 5.1.   
It is assumed that the farms engaging in machinery sharing have formed a limited 
liability company (LLC) which encompasses only the shared machinery.  Given this 
assumption, depreciation and other costs from sharing machinery can be transferred 
from one farm to another.  These costs are independent of the percentage of own shared 
costs borne by each farm.  Flexibility in allocating depreciation and costs potentially has 
important tax implications which may influence the decision to share machinery. 
The machinery sharing model is simulated for 1000 iterations using Simetar© 
(Richardson, Schumann, and Feldman 2006).  Each iteration represents five crop years.  
Stochastic crop yields and maturity dates are jointly drawn from distributions obtained 
from the wheat growth simulation model discussed in Chapter IV.  Prices are  
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Table 5.1  Description of All Farm Locations and Required Machinery 
Acreage (acres) 10,000 
Homestead (acres)          5 
Rotation wheat-fallow 
Ownership Sole 
Shared Machinery  
Combine 1 + 
Combine 2 + 
Non-Shared Machinery  
Tractor 255 hp 1 + 
Tractor 255 hp 2 + 
Tractor 255 hp 3 + 
Semi/Trailer 1 + 
Semi/Trailer 2 + 
3/4 ton Pickup New + 
3/4 ton Pickup Used + 
Grain Drill 1 + 
Grain Drill 2 + 
Grain Cart 1 + 
Grain Cart 2 + 
Heavy Duty Disk + 
Self-propelled Sprayer + 
 Note: + indicates required machinery 
 
 
 
also stochastic and are determined from an empirical distribution of state wheat prices.  
Yields and prices are assumed to be independent.  
Farm Combinations 
A total of five combinations of two farms’ sharing machinery are considered: 1) 
Pampa and Pampa; 2) Pampa and Dumas; 3) Pampa and Akron; 4) Pampa and Big 
Sandy; and 5) Akron and Big Sandy.  The combinations are chosen so that harvesting 
windows completely overlap (combination 1 and 2), partially overlap (combination 3 
and 5), and have very little overlap (combination 4).  In the Pampa and Pampa 
combination, the two farms are identical. 
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Net Present Value of After Tax Cash Flows 
Simulated NPV’s of after tax cash flows for each farm location are adapted from 
equations 3.6 and 3.7 of the Nash equilibrium theoretical model in Chapter III.  The 
adapted equation is 
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where i is either the first farm (Producer A) or the second farm (Producer B), is 
revenue generated in year t excluding government payments, are government 
payments, are non-shared variable and fixed costs, is federal income and self 
employment taxes,  is the penalty cost for untimely machinery delivery paid by 
producer i, is the percentage of shared costs paid by producer i, are shared 
machinery variable and fixed costs, and r is the discount rate.  For the first farm, 
, and for the second farm, where is the percentage of shared 
costs paid by Producer A.  If a penalty in year t is incurred,  enters the model as a 
cost (negative) for Producer A and as a benefit (positive) for Producer B.  A six percent 
discount rate is assumed (Federal Reserve Statistical Release 2005). 
i
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Revenues 
Revenues include receipts generated from wheat production and crop insurance. 
Annual revenue on a per acre basis is determined from the equation  
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where  is the randomly drawn stochastic wheat price for year t, is total wheat 
production,  is the corresponding total yield loss, is crop insurance payments, 
and is government payments.  Wheat is not harvested in years where yield and price 
are so low that net returns generated from wheat production and government payments 
are less than crop insurance payments.  Revenues are still generated in such years 
because of crop insurance payments but operating harvesting costs are zero.  
i
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i
tGP
i
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i
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i
tCI
Prices 
The randomly generated stochastic price is determined from an empirical 
distribution of correlated state wheat prices from 1990 to 2007 (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture 2007c).  Generated stochastic prices are comprised of two components.  The 
deterministic component is the mean or systematic variability of the random variable 
that is explainable.  The stochastic component, determined from the standard errors of 
the empirical distribution, is the unexplainable portion of the random variable 
(Richardson 2006).  When trends are present in the price data set, the deterministic 
component is the trend, and the stochastic component is the standard deviation of the 
residuals about the estimated trend line.  The trend equation is 
ttt YearT εβγ ++=
t
           (5.3) 
where γ, and β are the coefficients to be estimated, Yeart is the farm model simulation 
year (historical price data are years 1 through 18 and simulated years are 19, 20, 21, 22, 
and 23), andε  is the disturbance term.  Only Montana state price data showed a price 
trend that is statistically significant at the α = 0.05 percent level.  The Montana trend  
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Table 5.2 Summary Statistics of Wheat Prices in Dollars per Bushel by State 
from 1990 to 2007  
  Texas Colorado Montana
Mean 3.39 3.45 3.82
Standard Deviation 1.01 0.99 1.08
Minimum 2.28 2.23 2.80
Median 3.12 3.23 3.61
Maximum 6.30 6.35 7.60
  Source:  Summary statistics calculated from state wheat prices from 1990 to 2007  
   (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2007c). 
 
 
 
equation has an R2 of 0.25 and is calculated using 2.87 (0.47) as the intercept and 0.10 
(0.04) as the slope where values in parentheses are standard errors.   
Because prices are determined using state price data, Dumas and Pampa wheat 
prices are the same price.  Summary statistics of historical state wheat prices are given in 
Table 5.2.   
Government Payments 
 Following the loan deficiency payment program from the 2002 Farm Bill for 
wheat, government policy guarantees farmers a target price of $3.92 per bushel for years 
2004 to 2007 (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2004).  Wheat farmers are allowed to 
achieve this price using a combination of direct payments, loans, and counter-cyclical 
payments.  In this model, farmers are guaranteed the target price of $3.92 per bushel of 
harvested wheat through an end of the year direct payment.  Government payments per 
acre are determined from the equation  
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when the stochastic price, , is less than the target price, 3.92, the difference between 
the target and the stochastic prices is multiplied by the quantity of wheat produced, , 
minus any yield loss, , to determine government payments.  If the stochastically drawn 
price of wheat is greater than the target price, then no government payments are made.   
i
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i
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i
tL
Crop Insurance Payments    
The decision to harvest or not harvest is based on whichever action generates the 
highest net revenue.  If a producer decides to harvest, crop insurance payments equal 
zero.  If the producer does not harvest, crop insurance payments per acre are  
ii
t YCI )65.0)(00.3(= ,                      (5.5) 
where 3.00 is the crop insurance price guarantee, 0.65 is the crop insurance yield 
coverage percentage, and iY is the simulated mean yield.  All farm locations are insured 
at a 65 percent coverage level of simulated mean yields.  The mean yield is obtained 
from simulated yield data from 1990 to 2006 (Table 4.5).  All 5,000 planted acres are 
assumed to be insured.  The premium costs for Dumas, Pampa, Akron, and Big Sandy 
are $3.75, $3.50, $4.00 and $3.50 per acre. 
Yields 
Total wheat production, , is the product of the stochastically drawn wheat yield 
in bushels per acre multiplied by the number of planted acres.  To obtain a large number 
of consistent yields between the farms, DSSATv4 (2004) is used to generate wheat 
yields, see Chapter IV.  In the model, a randomly drawn simulated yield is obtained for 
each of the five years associated with an iteration.  One year of the 51 simulated years 
i
tZ
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Table 5.3  Simulated Wheat Yield Correlation Matrix between Farm Locations 
  Dumas Big Sandy Akron Pampa
Dumas 1 -0.11 0.26 0.63
Big Sandy  1 -0.16 -0.16
Akron   1 0.31
Pampa       1
 
 
 
(1956 to 2006) is drawn with replacement for each of the five years.  The year (not 
yield) drawn is the same for each farm.  Each selected year gives a corresponding yield 
and maturity date.  Because the same year is drawn for each farm, years are 100 percent 
correlated.  Factors not modeled that affect yields are accounted for within the model.  
Correlation coefficients between simulated yields are reported in Table 5.3. 
Harvesting Window Calculations 
 The maturity date is used as the basis for determining harvest starting day.  
Harvesting window for the first farm in Gregorian days is  
 ,                         (5.6) 17+= AtAt MDayHWS
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where is the harvesting window start date in year t, is the simulated 
maturity date, 17 days is the wheat dry-down period, is the harvesting window 
end date, is the harvesting time in days, and is the harvesting window in 
days.  Given that grain kernel moisture must be at an acceptable level to allow for safe 
storage, harvest is assumed to begin two and a half weeks (17 days) following the 
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simulated maturity date.  This assumption is based on data reported in Monson et al. 
(2007).  They report differences between physiological maturity and harvest starting 
time, based on kernel moisture, range between two and three weeks.   
The size of the combines used in this dissertation requires 25 workable days to 
harvest 5,000 acres of wheat.  Actual harvesting time depends on being able to harvest 
each day past the starting date.  This assumption is similar to previous studies that have 
used criterion based on a combination of soil moisture level, precipitation, and/or the 
number of precipitation events to determine suitable days for field machinery operations 
and soil workability (Whitson et al. 1981; Babeir, Colvin, and Marley 1986; Dillon, 
Mjelde, and McCarl 1989; Rotz and Harrigan 2005; Dyer and Baier 1979; Rounsevell 
1993).  A day is deemed unworkable if daily precipitation is greater than or equal to 0.1 
inches.  Rainfall greater than or equal to 0.1 inches for any day during the harvesting 
window is assumed to result in the lengthening of the harvest time and harvest window 
by one day.  This assumption is made because if rainfall occurs in the morning, then 
harvesting is halted for the remainder of that day to allow for the wheat stalks to dry.  If 
rainfall occurs in the evening, then harvesting is also delayed a full day to allow the 
wheat stalks to dry.               
It is assumed that the contract guarantees the first farmer 25 consecutive days 
from the harvesting window start date plus travel time to deliver the machinery without 
penalty.  Because the 25 contracted harvest days may not all be workable field days, the 
first farmer faces a decision 25 days after the harvesting window start date.  His/her 
decision is to either stop harvesting and leave the remainder of the crop in the field to 
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ensure timely machinery delivery or complete harvesting and potentially delay 
machinery delivery to the second farm.  The harvesting window for the first farm is 
completed when all wheat is harvested or 25 days after the harvest start date so 
machinery can be delivered to the second farm by the contracted machinery delivery 
date.  is chosen by the first producer such that net returns generated from 
harvesting additional days are greater than the incurred penalty payment from untimely 
machinery delivery.  The decision rule used by the first producer is presented in the 
penalty function section below (see equation 5.22). 
A
tHDay
The second farm begins harvest at the maximum of the drawn maturity date plus 
17 days or at the first farm’s ending harvest date plus travel time, 
B
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where Travelt is the travel time between the first farm and the second farm.  The end of 
the harvesting window for the second farm occurs when the last acre is harvested.  If the 
first farm does not harvest and collects the crop insurance payment, then there is timely 
machinery delivery to the second farm and harvesting begins 17 days after maturity.  
Field work days for the second farm are calculated similar to the first farm. 
Travel time between farm locations is a function of the distance and speed of 
travel.  The following values are assumed for travel time, average speed is 50 miles per 
hour (mph) with an average travel day of 10 hours.  Average speed and travel day 
includes fuel, food, rest stops, and machinery unloading.  To illustrate travel time 
calculations, consider the Pampa and Akron farms sharing machinery.  The distance 
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Table 5.4 Travel Time Between Farm Locations in Days 
 Dumas Pampa Big Sandy 
Akron 2.0 2.0 3.0 
Dumas 1.0 3.0 
Pampa  0.0 4.0 
 
 
 
between Pampa and Akron is 456 miles.  Travel time from Pampa to Akron is  
9.1
10
1
50
1)(456 =
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
=
hour
day
miles
hourmilesTravelt Days = 2 Days.                (5.10) 
Travel days are rounded to the next highest day.  Time to travel between each farm 
location is shown in Table 5.4. 
Yield Reductions Related to Harvesting Time 
As noted earlier, DSSATv4 is calibrated to county historical yields.  Because 
county historical yields are the average yield over all management decisions and 
weather, yield losses are already accounted for in the reported county historical yield.  It 
is assumed simulated wheat yields already account for yield loss from the date of 
maturity until the end of harvest in a normal year.  This loss includes the 17 day dry-
down period plus 25 consecutive harvesting days starting at the end of the dry-down 
period because simulated yields are calibrated to county historical yields.  Delays in 
harvesting and lengthening of the harvest window because of weather and/or untimely 
machinery delivery, however, are assumed not to be included in the simulated yields.  
The reported yield loss rate given by Bolland (1984), 0.5 percent per day, is used to 
determine additional yield loss from weather delays and untimely machinery delivery.  
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Delays in harvesting result in a 0.5 percent yield loss per acre for each additional day. 
Yield loss is 
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where  is the number of additional days, is the total number of delayed harvest days 
(including workable and non-workable days), is the stochastic simulated yield, 0.005 
is the one-half percent daily yield loss, and HR is the harvest rate in acres per day.  
Additional days for the first farm are the number of harvesting day delays from rainfall; 
whereas, additional days for the second farm are the number of days beyond the 
contracted machinery delivery date (25 days since maturity plus travel time) plus the 
number of harvesting day delays from rainfall.  The harvest rate, determined from the 
machinery capacity, is 200 acres per day. 
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Costs 
Wheat production costs are divided into two categories, shared and non-shared 
costs.  Both shared and non-shared costs, , are comprised of variable, , and 
fixed costs, , 
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where j is shared or non-shared costs.  Other non-production costs also included in the 
model are penalties and federal income and self employment taxes.  Because one 
objective is to examine after tax cash flow, both variable and fixed costs must be 
included.   
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Non-Shared Costs 
All ownership and operating costs unrelated to shared machinery are considered 
non-shared costs.  Fixed costs include factor payments for land including fallow acreage, 
real estate taxes, non-shared machinery depreciation, and machinery taxes, housing, and 
insurance.  Variable costs include seed, fertilizer, herbicide, crop insurance, operating 
interest, machinery interest, repairs, labor, and fuel and lube.  Non-machinery operating 
costs are consistent with the crop simulation model inputs.  Harvesting machinery 
operating costs, which include labor, repair and maintenance, and fuel and lube costs, are 
assessed to the producer operating the machinery.  
Additional costs are determined using information provided by Outlaw et al. 
(2007) and state costs projections (Texas AgriLife Extension 2007; University of Idaho 
2003; Colorado State University Cooperative Extension 2006).  Representative costs for 
all farm locations and assuming the percentage of shared machinery costs is 50 percent 
are shown in Tables 5.5 through 5.8.  Total costs including interest and depreciation are 
smallest for Akron at $93.16 per acre, followed by Big Sandy at $97.47 per acre, Pampa 
at $102.31 per acre, and Dumas at $102.58 per acre.  Variation in non-shared variable 
costs between farm locations is attributed to differences in fertilizer and operating 
interest costs.    
Shared Costs  
Harvesting machinery ownership costs are the only costs potentially shared by 
producers.  If machinery is shared, then harvesting ownership costs are the percentage of 
shared machinery costs.  When machinery is not shared, each producer bears all  
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Table 5.5  Costs Estimate for Dumas, TX Sharing Machinery 
  
Quantity 
per Acre Units
Price 
per Unit 
Cost per 
Acre Total Cost 
Operating Costs  
Seed 1.00 bu 4.22 4.22 21100.00
Fertilizer 70.00 lbs 0.23 16.10 80500.00
Herbicide 1.00 acre 6.37 6.37 31850.00
Crop Insurance 1.00 acre 3.75 3.75 18750.00
Non-Shared Machinery  
Fuel and Lube 16.44 82200.00
Repair and Maintenance 6.77 33850.00
Labor 7.18 35900.00
Harvesting Machinery Costs1  
Fuel and Lube 5.32 26600.00
Repair and Maintenance 3.16 15800.00
Labor 3.18 15900.00
Operation Interest@7.0% 3.81 19028.63
        
Total Operating Costs 76.30 381478.63
  
Ownership Costs  
Land Payments2  
Principal 3.13 31250.00
Interest 2.97 29735.72
Real Estate Taxes 1.80 9000.00
Non Shared Machinery  
Depreciation 7.96 39815.54
Taxes, Housing,              
 Insurance 2.32 11600.00
Harvesting Machinery Costs1  
Depreciation 7.10 35491.69
Taxes, Housing,        
 Insurance 1.00 5000.00
        
Total Ownership Costs 26.28 161892.95
            
Total Costs    102.58 543371.57
1Shared machinery operating and ownership costs are calculated assuming the 
percentage of costs shared is 50 percent. 
2Includes allocation of fallow acres and are the average costs over the five years.  
Actual year costs are used in the simulation model. 
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Table 5.6  Costs Estimate for Pampa, TX Sharing Machinery 
  
Quantity 
per Acre Units
Price 
per Unit 
Cost per 
Acre Total Cost 
Operating Costs  
Seed 1.00 bu 4.22 4.22 21100.00
Fertilizer 70.00 lbs 0.23 16.10 80500.00
Herbicide 1.00 acre 6.37 6.37 31850.00
Crop Insurance 1.00 acre 3.50 3.50 17500.00
Non-Shared Machinery  
Fuel and Lube 16.44 82200.00
Repair and Maintenance 6.77 33850.00
Labor 7.18 35900.00
Harvesting Machinery Costs1  
Fuel and Lube 5.32 26600.00
Repair and Maintenance 3.16 15800.00
Labor 3.18 15900.00
Operation Interest@7.0% 3.79 18963.00
        
Total Operating Costs 76.03 380163.00
  
Ownership Costs  
Factor Payments2  
Principal 3.13 31250.00
Interest 2.97 29735.72
Real Estate Taxes 1.80 9000.00
Non Shared Machinery  
Depreciation 7.96 39815.54
Taxes, Housing,    
 Insurance 2.32 11600.00
Harvesting Machinery Costs1  
Depreciation 7.10 35491.69
Taxes, Housing,  
 Insurance 1.00 5000.00
        
Total Ownership Costs 26.28 161892.95
        
Total Costs    102.31 542055.95
1Shared machinery operating and ownership costs are calculated assuming the 
percentage of costs shared is 50 percent. 
2Includes allocation of fallow acres and are the average costs over the five years.  
Actual year costs are used in the simulation model. 
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Table 5.7  Costs Estimate for Akron, CO Sharing Machinery 
  
Quantity 
per Acre Units
Price 
per Unit 
Cost per 
Acre Total Cost 
Operating Costs  
Seed 1.00 bu 4.22 4.22 21100.00
Fertilizer 30.00 lbs 0.23 6.90 34500.00
Herbicide 1.00 acre 6.37 6.37 31850.00
Crop Insurance 1.00 acre 4.00 4.00 20000.00
Non-Shared Machinery  
Fuel and Lube 16.44 82200.00
Repair and Maintenance 6.77 33850.00
Labor 7.18 35900.00
Harvesting Machinery Costs1  
Fuel and Lube 5.32 26600.00
Repair and Maintenance 3.16 15800.00
Labor 3.18 15900.00
Operation Interest@7.0% 3.34 16679.25
        
Total Operating Costs 66.88 334379.25
  
Ownership Costs  
Factor Payments2  
Principal 3.13 31250.00
Interest 2.97 29735.72
Real Estate Taxes 1.80 9000.00
Non Shared Machinery  
Depreciation 7.96 39815.54
Taxes, Housing,  
 Insurance 2.32 11600.00
Harvesting Machinery Costs1  
Depreciation 7.10 35491.69
Taxes, Housing,  
 Insurance 1.00 5000.00
        
Total Ownership Costs 26.28 161892.95
        
Total Costs    93.16 496272.20
1Shared machinery operating and ownership costs are calculated assuming the 
percentage of costs shared is 50 percent. 
2Includes allocation of fallow acres and are the average costs over the five years.  
Actual year costs are used in the simulation model. 
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Table 5.8  Costs Estimate for Big Sandy, MT Sharing Machinery 
  
Quantity 
per Acre Units
Price 
per Unit 
Cost per 
Acre Total Cost 
Operating Costs  
Seed 1.00 bu 4.22 4.22 21100.00
Fertilizer 50.00 lbs 0.23 11.50 57500.00
Herbicide 1.00 acre 6.37 6.37 31850.00
Crop Insurance 1.00 acre 3.50 3.50 17500.00
Non-Shared Machinery  
Fuel and Lube 16.44 82200.00
Repair and Maintenance 6.77 33850.00
Labor 7.18 35900.00
Harvesting Machinery Costs1  
Fuel and Lube 5.32 26600.00
Repair and Maintenance 3.16 15800.00
Labor 3.18 15900.00
Operation Interest@7.0% 3.55 17755.50
        
Total Operating Costs 71.19 355955.50
  
Ownership Costs  
Land Payments2  
Principal 3.13 31250.00
Interest 2.97 29735.72
Real Estate Taxes 1.80 9000.00
Non Shared Machinery  
Depreciation 7.96 39815.54
Taxes, Housing,  
 Insurance 2.32 11600.00
Harvesting Machinery Costs1  
Depreciation 7.10 35491.69
Taxes, Housing,  
 Insurance 1.00 5000.00
        
Total Ownership Costs 26.28 161892.95
            
Total Costs    97.47 517848.45
1Shared machinery operating and ownership costs are calculated assuming the 
percentage of costs shared is 50 percent. 
2Includes allocation of fallow acres and are the average costs over the five years.  
Actual year costs are used in the simulation model. 
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Table 5.9  Machinery Operating and Ownership Costs for Non-Shared and 
Harvesting Machinery 
 
Non-
Shared
Harvesting 
Non-Sharing
Harvesting 
Sharing
Total 
Sharing1 
Total Non-
Sharing2
Depreciation 7.96 12.53 14.20 14.23 20.49
Interest 9.39 9.04 4.52 13.91 18.43
Taxes, housing,   
and insurance 2.32 4.00 2 4.32 6.32
Repairs 6.77 2.96 6.32 8.25 9.73
Labor 7.18 3.18 3.18 8.77 10.36
Fuel/Lube 16.44 5.32 5.32 19.10 21.76
1Total Sharing is the summation of non-shared and shared harvesting costs assuming the   
  percentage of shared costs is 50%. 
2Total Non-Sharing is the summation of all non-shared and all harvesting costs. 
 
 
 
harvesting machinery ownership costs.  Harvesting machinery ownership costs include 
depreciation, principal, interest, taxes, housing, and insurance for the two combines.  
Total machinery operating and ownership costs per acre when sharing and not sharing 
machinery are given in Table 5.9.  Although the machinery is the same in the shared and 
non-shared cases, costs are higher in the shared case because of the additional use of the 
combines and travel costs.   
Travel costs are shared by the percentage of shared costs paid.  To illustrate how 
travel costs are calculated, consider Pampa and Akron sharing machinery.  Total travel 
costs are 
60.2097$30.2$)456)(2($))(2( ===
mile
miles
mile
milesTravelC                     (5.13) 
where 2 is the number of trips (roundtrip), miles is the one-way distance between the two 
farms, and $2.30 is the trucking rate per loaded mile.  
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The percentage of owned debt-free land and non-shared machinery is also 
considered.  The percentage of land and machinery that is debt free is important in 
determining yearly interest payments and may impact the decision to share machinery.  
A farmer who owns his/her machinery and land debt free, for example, would have 
smaller tax deductions and may be more willing to share machinery if he/she is able to 
use a larger portion of the depreciation.  The other extreme would be a farmer who has 
high land and machinery debt giving large tax deductions.  In this case, the farmer may 
consider machinery sharing to solely reduce machinery costs because additional tax 
deductions have little impact.  In this model, it is assumed that each farm refinanced the 
loan amount for both land and non-shared machinery at the beginning of the five 
simulated years.  Shared machinery is assumed to be purchased in year one and sold at 
the end of the fifth year.  Sensitivity analysis is conducted by varying the percentage of 
ownership for both land and non-shared machinery.  
Machinery Costs 
The Machinery Cost Analysis software program (Smathers, Patterson, and 
Shroeder 2002) is used to develop machinery operating and ownership costs for 
machinery and equipment utilization on the 10,000 acre farms.  Purchase price, years to 
trade, and salvage values of machinery are given in Table 5.10.  Because harvesting 
machinery is used twice as much when sharing machinery, salvage values for harvesting 
machinery when sharing are assumed to be 35 percent of the non-sharing salvage value 
(Stewart 2008).  
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Table 5.10  Description of Machinery Set  
  
Purchase 
Price
Years to 
Trade
Salvage Value 
Non-Sharing  
Salvage Value 
Sharing
Combine New 1 $240,000.00 5 $83,388.76  $62,541.57 
Combine New 2 $240,000.00 5 $83,388.76  $62,541.57 
Semi/Trailer 1 $50,000.00 25 $4,748.59  $4,748.59 
Semi/Trailer 2 $50,000.00 25 $4,748.59  $4,748.59 
Tractor 255 hp 1 $115,000.00 15 $22,388.46  $22,388.46 
Tractor 255 hp 2 $115,000.00 15 $22,388.46  $22,388.46 
Tractor 255 hp 3 $115,000.00 15 $22,388.46  $22,388.46 
3/4 ton Pickup New $38,000.00 10 $14,369.96  $14,369.96 
3/4 ton Pickup Used $10,000.00 6 $3,781.57  $3,781.57 
Grain Drill 1 $43,000.00 12 $5,955.78  $5,955.78 
Grain Drill 2 $43,000.00 12 $5,955.78  $5,955.78 
Grain Cart 1 $15,000.00 15 $1,440.10  $1,440.10 
Grain Cart 2 $15,000.00 15 $1,440.10  $1,440.10 
Heavy Duty Disk $20,000.00 15 $1,920.13  $1,920.13 
Self-propelled Sprayer $85,000.00 15 $8,704.58  $8,704.58 
 
 
 
All farm locations follow a wheat-fallow minimum till rotation and in the fall 
after fallowing, fields are disked prior to planting winter wheat.  In the case of spring 
wheat production, fields are not disked until the spring of the planting year.  To reduce 
soil erosion, there is no tillage following wheat harvest.  Because wheat stubble is left in 
the field until just before planting, there is reduced weed growth and soil erosion, and 
increased soil moisture (Klein 2006).   
Depreciation costs are determined using straight-line depreciation net of salvage 
value.  Operating interest rate is seven percent.  Labor to operate machinery costs $12.15 
per hour, whereas non-machine labor costs $7.20 per hour. 
Machinery Usage Calculations 
The methodology used to determine machinery usage given in Table 5.11 is 
illustrated below.  Annual usage of machinery is determined using engineering equations 
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provided by the American Society of Agricultural and Biological Engineers.  The latest 
equations and typical value ranges were last updated in February of 2006 (American 
Society of Agricultural and Biological Engineers 2006a, 2006b).  Area capacity for farm 
operations is determined using  
25.8
fswEAC = ,              (5.14) 
where AC is area capacity in acres per hour, s is field speed in miles per hour, w is 
implement working width in feet, Ef is field efficiency, and 8.25 is a constant with units 
used to convert to acres per hour.  Typical values provided in American Society of 
Agricultural and Biological Engineers (2006b) for field speed, implement working 
width, and field efficiency are used to determine area capacity.  Field efficiency accounts 
for time lost because of operator capability, habits, and field characteristics.  Turning, 
idle travel, material handling, cleaning clogged equipment, machinery adjustment, 
lubrication, and refueling, account for the majority of time loss (American Society of 
Agricultural and Biological Engineers 2006a).  An example of area capacity calculations 
for a 255 horsepower tractor pulling a heavy duty disk is  
57.24
25.8
)85.0)(53)(/5.4(
25.8
=== feethourmilesswEAC f acres per hour,   (5.15) 
where s is the field speed in miles per hour, w is the implement working width in feet, 
and Ef is the field efficiency. 
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Table 5.11  Machinery Usage by Farm Location for Non-sharing of 
Harvesting Machinery 
  Akron Dumas Pampa Big Sandy
Shared Machinery Hours 
Combine New 1 273 273 273 273
Combine New 2 273 273 273 273
Non-Shared Machinery     
Tractor 255 hp 1 300 300 300 300
Tractor 255 hp 2 300 300 300 300
Tractor 255 hp 3 203 203 203 203
Grain Drill 2 164 164 164 164
Grain Cart 1 136 136 136 136
Grain Cart 2 136 136 136 136
Heavy Duty Disk 407 407 407 407
Self-propelled Sprayer 108 108 108 108
Non-Shared Machinery Miles 
Semi/Trailer 1 5000 5000 5000 5000
Semi/Trailer 2 5000 5000 5000 5000
3/4 ton Pickup New 12000 12000 12000 12000
3/4 ton Pickup Used 12000 12000 12000 12000
 
 
 
Total annual usage of each implement and power unit is found using effective 
field capacity and total acreage.  Annual usage of a 255 horsepower tractor pulling a 
heavy duty disk, for example, is 
===
houracres
acres
AC
AcreageUsageAnnual
/57.24
000,5  203 hours.                     (5.16) 
Recall, the harvested acreage is 5,000 acres per farm.  Calculations are similar for 
determining area capacity and annual usage of equipment for other operations and farms.  
Annual usage of equipment for each farm is given in Table 5.11.  
To determine the time required to complete each farm operation, Ti, the 
following assumptions are made.  First, a workday is assumed to be 10 hours long with 
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80 percent field scheduling efficiency, Es.  Managers’ ability to make use of personal 
and employee workable working hours is defined scheduling efficiency.  Farm acreage, 
A, must also be known.  Continuing the previous example of the time required to prepare 
the seed bed by disking, the required time to complete this operation is 
)/57.24)(8.0)(/10(
000,5
)/)()(/10(
houracresdayhrs
acres
houracresACEdayhrs
acresT
s
i
=
=
 
    = 25.43 days,                      (5.17) 
 when only one disk is used and half of the acreage is fallowed.  
Annual usage of ¾ ton new and used pick-up trucks is assumed to be 12,000 
miles for each farm.  Machinery usage for shared machinery is calculated using similar 
procedures.  Total hours of machinery usage for shared machinery are the sum of usage 
occurring between machinery sharing farm locations.  
Federal Self-Employment and Income Taxes 
Both annual self-employment and income taxes are calculated.  Annual self-
employment taxes are composed of two separate taxes, a Social Security tax, and a 
Medicare tax.  The social security tax is the minimum of 12.4 percent on the first 
$102,000 of taxable income or 92.35 percent multiplied on all taxable income.  Medicare 
tax is 2.9 percent on all taxable income.  Self-employment taxes are  
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧= )(9235.0)000,102(124.0min incometaxableorSST    (5.18) 
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and ,                               (5.19) 
where SST is the social security tax, MT is the medicare tax, 0.9235 is a percentage 
multiplied by the taxable income to determine self-employment taxes under the regular 
method, and taxable income is the total self-employment taxable income (RIA Federal 
Tax Handbook 2008).  Taxable income is the revenue generated from wheat sales, 
government payments, crop insurance payments, and penalties (positive for farm 1 and 
negative for farm 1) minus cash operating expenses and depreciation.  Total self-
employment taxes are the sum of self-employment income (social security tax) and 
Medicare taxes.  To reduce taxation impacts from differences in state laws, all state 
income taxes are assumed to be zero.  This assumption has no effect on the Texas farms 
because Texas does not have a state income tax.  There is some effect, however, on the 
Montana and Colorado farms because these states have state income taxes.  
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧= )(029.0 incometaxableMT
 Federal income taxes are calculated using adjusted gross income.  Adjusted gross 
income is self employment taxable income minus one-half of self-employment taxes, 
any business carryover loss from the previous year, standard deductions, and personal 
exemptions.  The federal tax liability is found by applying 2007’s Schedule Y-1 to 
adjusted gross income.  In addition to depreciation, operating expenses, interest, and 
property taxes, additional annual income tax deductible items include a standard 
deduction of $10,900 (married and filing jointly) and a personal exemption of $14,000 
(husband, wife, and two children).  
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Base Contractual Penalty 
The base penalty is similar to the theoretical penalty payment as a function of 
machinery set and delivery date discussed in Chapter III.  Both penalties overcome the 
lack of incentive for the first farm to deliver the shared machinery set once the 
contracted delivery date has been missed.  As noted earlier, the contract is assumed to 
allow 25 consecutive days of harvest plus travel time without penalty.  When the 
harvesting machinery is not delivered to the second farm location at the specified date, a 
penalty cost of 
( )BtBtAt LPPen −= ,                                          (5.20) 
is assessed to farm A and  
A
t
B
t PenPen −=                     (5.21) 
is paid to farm B.  In this equation, is the price of wheat received by farm B, and  
is farm B’s cumulative yield loss in bushels incurred because of delayed harvest from 
untimely machinery delivery only.  If  is zero, then the penalty assessed to farm A is 
zero.   
B
tP
B
tL
B
tL
Producer A must decide between completing the harvest and paying the penalty 
or terminating the harvest early and paying zero penalty at the end of the 25 contracted 
harvest days.  The second producer receives the penalty amount to compensate for loss 
in yield from delayed harvesting.  The penalty increases each day beyond the contracted 
delivery date that Producer A delays delivery because of   Producer B’s increased yield 
loss.  As discussed in the theoretical model, Producer A is comparing marginal revenue 
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generated from harvesting each additional day beyond the contracted date to own 
marginal costs and marginal penalty cost.  Producer A continues harvesting until 
marginal revenue from harvesting is less than or equal to marginal costs (own and 
penalty).     
The decision rule used by Producer A to continue harvesting or deliver the 
machinery to Producer B is determined by the equation  
B
t
B
t
A
t
A
t
A
t
A
t LPHCKPDEC −−= ,                               (5.22) 
where is the price received by farm A,  is the total wheat left in the field to be 
harvested, are Producer A’s harvesting costs for the acreage remaining to be 
harvested, and and are as defined earlier.  If  is greater than zero, it is more 
profitable for Producer A to complete harvesting, pay the penalty, and delay machinery 
delivery.  When is less than zero, the penalty is greater than additional revenues 
minus harvesting costs and Producer A is better off delivering the machinery on the 
specified contract date.  The penalty acts as an incentive for timely delivery of the 
machinery.  Note that Producer B’s yield loss used in equation 5.22 is only yield loss 
attributed to untimely machinery delivery and not total yield losses. Producer A is only 
required to compensate for yield loss resulting from retaining the machinery beyond the 
contracted delivery date. 
A
tP
A
tK
A
tHC
tP
B B
tL
A
t
A
tDEC
DEC
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Table 5.12 Averaged Annual Percent Change in Inflation Rates 
Annual Inflation Rate for Taxes 5.42% 
Annual Inflation Rate for Wages 3.09% 
Annual Inflation Rate for Fuel 9.47% 
Annual Interest Rate for Savings 4.88% 
Annual Inflation Rate for Variable and Fixed Costs 2.47% 
Annual Inflation Rate for Land Value 6.66% 
      Source:  Averages determined from the Food and Agricultural Policy  
       Research Institute 2006, 2008) and the National Agricultural Statistics  
       Service (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2008).   
 
 
 
Inflation 
 Annual inflation rates for taxes, wages, variable and fixed costs, fuel, operating 
interest, savings, land value and machinery are included (Table 5.12).  Rates are 
determined by averaging percent change in values from the Food and Agricultural Policy 
Research Institute baselines (Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute 2006, 
2008) and the National Agricultural Statistics Service (U.S. Department of Agriculture 
2008).  In year 1, all rates equal zero, making 2006 the base.  Annual rates are assumed 
to be the same for years simulated.  Changes in annual inflation rates for variable and 
fixed costs of production are equal to the annual inflation change for the Consumer Price 
Index.    
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CHAPTER VI 
RESULTS 
 
Besides simulating NPV of after tax cash flows, as discussed in Chapter V, the 
present value of revenues, costs, federal self-employment and income taxes, and penalty 
payments are simulated for five years using a six percent discount rate.  Although not 
presented in this chapter, NPV of ending net worth is also calculated.  Cumulative 
distribution graphs of present value of revenues, costs, federal self-employment and 
income taxes, penalty payments, and NPV of ending net worth are given in Appendix A.  
Only differences in the NPV of after tax cash flows are presented in this chapter.  
Differences are calculated as shared NPV after tax cash flows minus non-shared NPV 
after tax cash flows over 1000 iterations, where each iteration represents five years.  For 
simplicity, NPV of after tax cash flows is sometimes referred to as simply NPV.   
Four contractual issues are examined.  First, in addition to the base case penalty, 
three additional potential penalty functions are examined.  Second, the percentage of 
shared costs is varied from zero to 100 percent for each farm (recall farm 2’s percentage 
is one minus farm 1’s percentage).  Third, the effect of machinery size is simulated.  
Fourth, sensitivity analysis on the percentage of shared machinery depreciation is 
examined.  Sensitivity analysis on the simulated parameters is also conducted by varying 
the percentage of debt free land and non-shared machinery, discount rate, yield reduction 
from untimely machinery delivery, yields, and prices. 
 
 Table 6.1  Differences in Expected Values and Standard Deviations of NPV of After Tax Cash Flows for the Base 
Penalty Payment for Each Farm Combination Assuming Different Percentages of Shared Costs Paid (in Hundred 
Thousand Dollars) 
  Pampa & Pampa Pampa & Dumas Pampa & Akron Pampa & Big Sandy Akron & Big Sandy
 Pampa Pampa Pampa Dumas Pampa Akron Pampa Big Sandy Akron Big Sandy
Farm One Pays 100% 
Mean -1.266 2.993 -1.292 2.948 -1.284 4.047 -1.406 4.558 -1.444 3.954
Standard 
Deviation -0.037 -0.418 -0.038 -0.451 -0.032 -0.066 -0.019 -0.330 -0.052 -0.386
Farm One Pays 75% 
Mean 0.338 1.426 0.316 1.483 0.341 2.714 0.259 3.120 -0.070 2.510
Standard 
Deviation -0.101 -0.356 -0.102 -0.388 -0.098 -0.068 -0.088 -0.281 -0.060 -0.334
Farm One Pays 50% 
Mean 1.917 -0.168 1.899 -0.007 1.941 1.377 1.897 1.665 1.298 1.047
Standard 
Deviation -0.175 -0.304 -0.176 -0.317 -0.175 -0.068 -0.167 -0.221 -0.064 -0.271
Farm One Pays 25% 
Mean 3.463 -1.779 3.448 -1.522 3.506 0.036 3.497 0.190 2.661 -0.438
Standard 
Deviation -0.255 -0.265 -0.256 -0.244 -0.256 -0.066 -0.252 -0.151 -0.065 -0.201
Farm One Pays 0% 
Mean 4.972 -3.401 4.961 -3.060 5.033 -1.310 5.058 -1.306 4.020 -1.944
Standard 
Deviation -0.329 -0.236 -0.331 -0.174 -0.332 -0.060 -0.331 -0.077 -0.063 -0.129
96
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Base Farm Scenarios 
The base farm scenarios are as developed in the previous chapter.  In these 
scenarios, farm 1’s penalty payment to farm 2 is 100 percent of the yield losses 
associated with untimely machinery delivery; farm 1 bears all the risk associated with 
untimely machinery delivery.  As expected, when the percentage of shared costs borne 
by the first farm is 100 percent, differences in mean NPV of after tax cash flows are 
negative for the first farm and positive for the second farm for every farm combination 
(Table 6.1).  This indicates that the first farm would never share harvesting machinery if 
it bears all shared costs and all the risk.  Obviously, the second farm is willing to share 
harvesting machinery if it pays none of the shared costs and assumes none of the risk.   
Besides the 100 percent payment scenario, the only other scenario where farm 
1’s mean difference is negative is when the percentage of shared costs borne by farm 1 is 
75 percent for the Akron and Big Sandy combination.  Akron has a negative mean 
difference in NPV because of the higher average price Big Sandy receives (almost 
$0.37/bu larger than Akron’s price).  Given that Akron has to compensate Big Sandy for 
yield loss beyond the contractual date at the price that Big Sandy receives, untimely 
machinery delivery is costly to Akron.  This penalty payment combined with paying the 
majority of shared costs causes the difference in mean NPV to be negative. 
Differences in mean NPV of after tax cash flows for farm 2 are positive when 
farm 1 pays either 75 percent or 100 percent of the shared costs.  When shared costs are 
split evenly or when farm 2 pays a larger percentage of the costs, the overlap in 
harvesting window helps determine if the change in NPV is positive or negative.  Similar 
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to farm 1, if farm 2 pays 100 percent of the costs, its changes in NPV of after tax of cash 
flows are always negative.  When the harvesting windows highly overlap, Pampa – 
Pampa (100 percent overlap) and Pampa – Dumas, even at 50 percent sharing of costs 
farm 2’s change in NPV of after tax cash flows is negative.  Negative changes in NPV 
occur because farm 1 is not required to compensate for yield losses before the end of the 
25 days stipulated in the contract.  Recall, the contract in the base farms provides the 
first farm 25 days from the start of harvest to complete harvest without any penalty.  
Farm 2, therefore, may have up to 25 days of uncompensated yield loss. 
When the harvest windows only partially overlap, Pampa – Akron and Pampa – 
Big Sandy, farm 2 can pay 75 percent of the costs and still have a positive change in 
mean NPV of after tax cash flows.  The Akron – Big Sandy combination has a negative 
cash flow change for Big Sandy when Big Sandy pays 75 percent of the shared costs.  
These changes in NPV are similar to those discussed when the first farm pays the 
majority of shared costs.   
There are interactions between the percentage of shared costs, harvesting 
windows, and farm specific characteristics.  In general, differences in NPV of after tax 
cash flows are larger when harvesting windows have little overlap because yield losses 
from untimely machinery delivery are reduced.  Harvesting windows, however, do not 
fully explain the differences in NPV of after tax cash flows.  Farm specific factors 
including price, yield, and weather also contribute to differences in NPV of after tax 
cash flows.                
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Positive standard deviation differences indicate an increase in risk and negative 
differences indicate a reduction in risk.  Differences in standard deviations of NPV of 
after tax cash flows for all farms in every farm combination are negative.  Reduction in 
risk is partially caused by shared machinery costs being spread over two farms instead of 
only one farm.  As the percentage of shared costs paid for a farm is reduced, the 
differences in standard deviations become more negative (less risky) for all farms in 
every combination except for Akron in both the Pampa – Akron and Akron – Big Sandy 
combinations.  With the exception of Akron, risk decreases as the percentage of shared 
costs decrease because the farm is liable for fewer costs.   
Annual Percent Change of After Tax Cash Flows 
Average annual percent changes of after tax cash flows for the base case are 
given in Table 6.2.  Changes are calculated by dividing the five year differences in 
expected values of NPV of after tax cash flows (Table 6.1) by the absolute value of the 
mean NPV of after tax cash flow when non-sharing harvesting machinery and then 
dividing by 5.  Absolute values are used because some mean NPV of after tax cash flows 
are negative.  The reader is cautioned in using the percentages because of this issue.   
A wide range of annual percentage changes are noted.  As the percentage of shared costs 
paid increases, the average annual percentage change in after tax cash flows decreases 
for all farms and all combinations.  For the Dumas farm, some of the annual percent 
changes are large in absolute value, ranging up to 486 percent in the Pampa – Dumas 
combination.  The reason the percentages are large is the absolute value of the mean 
NPV of after tax cash flows when non-sharing harvesting machinery is small.  
  
 
 
Table 6.2  Average Annual Percent Change in Expected NPV of After Tax Cash Flows and Percent 
Change in the Five Year Standard Deviation for the Base Penalty Case 
  Pampa & Pampa Pampa & Dumas Pampa & Akron Pampa & Big Sandy Akron & Big Sandy
 Pampa Pampa Pampa Dumas Pampa Akron Pampa Big Sandy Akron Big Sandy
Farm 1 Pays 100% 
Mean -9.53 22.53 -9.72 467.96 -9.67 9.55 -10.58 141.00 -3.41 122.31
Standard 
Deviation -1.42 -16.30 -1.48 -14.53 -1.25 -1.96 -0.76 -8.72 -1.56 -10.19
Farm 1 Pays 75% 
Mean 2.54 10.74 2.38 235.42 2.57 6.41 1.95 96.52 -0.17 77.65
Standard 
Deviation -3.93 -13.89 -3.99 -12.49 -3.83 -2.03 -3.41 -7.41 -1.79 -8.81
Farm 1 Pays 50% 
Mean 14.43 -1.26 14.29 -1.17 14.61 3.25 14.28 51.49 3.06 32.38
Standard 
Deviation -6.82 -11.86 -6.87 -10.19 -6.80 -2.03 -6.49 -5.82 -1.90 -7.16
Farm 1 Pays 25% 
Mean 26.06 -13.39 25.95 -241.62 26.39 0.08 26.32 5.86 6.28 -13.55
Standard 
Deviation -9.92 -10.33 -9.97 -7.85 -9.97 -1.98 -9.80 -3.99 -1.94 -5.30
Farm 1 Pays 0% 
Mean 37.43 -25.60 37.34 -485.72 37.88 -3.09 38.07 -9.83 9.49 -60.14
Standard 
Deviation -12.82 -9.19 -12.88 -5.59 -12.93 -1.80 -12.89 -2.99 -1.89 -3.39
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With a small denominator, even small increases in NPV of cash flows can lead to large 
percentage changes.  The only other farm showing such large percentage changes is the 
Big Sandy farm, which occur at the extreme cost sharing percentages.   
As other examples, consider the Pampa – Pampa, Pampa – Dumas, and Pampa – 
Akron, and Pampa – Big Sandy combinations when farm 1 pays 75 percent of the shared 
costs.  Farm 1 has approximately a two percent annual average increase in NPV cash 
flows.  The second farm has a 10 percent increase in the Pampa – Pampa combination, a 
235 percent increase in the Pampa – Dumas combination, a six percent increase in the 
Pampa – Akron combination, and a 96 percent increase in the Pampa – Big Sandy 
combination.  When farm 1 pays 50 percent of the shared costs in the Akron – Big 
Sandy combination, Akron has a three percent increase and Big Sandy has a 32 percent 
increase in average annual after tax cash flows. 
Alternative Penalty Functions 
 When wheat is mature and ready to harvest but machinery delivery is delayed, 
harvesting obviously cannot begin.  For each day of delayed harvest there is a reduction 
in yields.  The penalty functions considered allow for the risk associated with untimely 
machinery delivery to be incurred all by farm 1 (Base Farms – scenario previously 
discussed), all by farm 2 (No Penalty), and to be shared equally between the two farms 
(Penalty Payment 50 Percent).  A fourth penalty (Lump Sum Penalty) is also considered.  
Penalties are consistent with theoretical penalty functions described in Chapter III.
 
 102
No Penalty Payment 
In terms of who bears the risk associated with untimely machinery delivery, the 
other extreme from the base scenario is when farm 2 bears all the risk.  In this case, farm 
1 does not pay a penalty for untimely delivery.  As expected, when no penalty is paid by 
farm 1, farm 1 is always better off and farm 2 is always worse off than in the base case 
(Table 6.3 versus Table 6.1).  Signs of the differences in NPV of after tax cash flows are 
the same in the base penalty and no penalty cases.  As the harvesting window overlap 
decreases, there is less yield loss from untimely machinery delivery and the penalty 
becomes less important to machinery sharing.  For example, in Pampa – Big Sandy, 
there is almost no overlap of harvesting windows; as such, differences between the base 
and no penalty cases are almost nonexistent.  Standard deviation differences are not 
identical to the base case, but inferences are similar. 
Penalty Payment 50 Percent 
 In this case, the penalty payment, therefore, risk of untimely delivery is 
shared equally between farms 1 and 2.  Farm 1 pays one-half of the yield losses that 
occur beyond the contracted date which allows farms engaging in sharing machinery to 
equally share harvesting window risk.  Because of the reduced penalty, farm 1 chooses 
to complete harvest and delay machinery delivery to farm 2 more often than in the base 
case.  For instance, in the Pampa – Pampa combination, the first farm chooses to 
complete harvest 84 percent of the simulated years in the base case, but finishes 
harvesting in 92 percent of the simulated years when the penalty payment is shared 
equally.  Harvesting is not completed three percent of the simulated years in both  
 
   
 
Table 6.3  Differences in Expected Values and Standard Deviations of NPV of After Tax Cash Flows for No Penalty 
Payment for Each Farm Combination Assuming Different Percentages of Shared Costs Paid (in Hundred 
Thousand Dollars) 
  Pampa & Pampa Pampa & Dumas Pampa & Akron Pampa & Big Sandy Akron & Big Sandy
 Pampa Pampa Pampa Dumas Pampa Akron Pampa Big Sandy Akron Big Sandy
Farm 1 Pays 100% 
Mean -1.168 2.872 -1.181 2.839 -1.255 4.028 -1.405 4.558 -1.386 3.886
Standard 
Deviation -0.037 -0.422 -0.036 -0.455 -0.031 -0.072 -0.019 -0.330 -0.046 -0.398
Farm 1 Pays 75% 
Mean 0.433 1.302 0.424 1.372 0.370 2.695 0.259 3.120 -0.013 2.440
Standard 
Deviation -0.103 -0.361 -0.102 -0.391 -0.097 -0.074 -0.087 -0.281 -0.054 -0.345
Farm 1 Pays 50% 
Mean 2.010 -0.295 2.004 -0.118 1.969 1.358 1.898 1.664 1.355 0.975
Standard 
Deviation -0.178 -0.310 -0.177 -0.320 -0.173 -0.075 -0.166 -0.220 -0.057 -0.281
Farm 1 Pays 25% 
Mean 3.552 -1.907 3.549 -1.633 3.532 0.017 3.498 0.189 2.718 -0.511
Standard 
Deviation -0.257 -0.272 -0.257 -0.247 -0.255 -0.073 -0.251 -0.151 -0.058 -0.211
Farm 1 Pays 0% 
Mean 5.058 -3.529 5.058 -3.171 5.058 -1.329 5.058 -1.307 4.077 -2.020
Standard 
Deviation -0.331 -0.243 -0.331 -0.178 -0.331 -0.067 -0.331 -0.076 -0.056 -0.138
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scenarios because crop insurance payments are larger than the value of harvested wheat 
plus government payments.  Results and inferences for this case are similar to those of 
no penalty payment, as such the results are not presented. 
Lump Sum Penalty Payment 
Here, it is assumed a lump sum penalty of $2,500 is paid by farm 1 to farm 2 if 
the contracted machinery delivery date is not met regardless of the number of days 
beyond the contracted date.  Relative to the base case, in some farm combinations, farm 
1 is better off and farm 2 is worse off.  For example, in the Pampa – Pampa combination, 
farm 1 is better off and farm 2 is worse off than the base case at all percentages of shared 
costs because the lump sum amount is less than the value of farm 2’s yield losses.  
Similar to the base case, farm 1 chooses to complete harvest 84 percent of the simulated 
years when a lump sum penalty is used.  When a larger lump sum penalty of $10,000 is 
paid, farm 1 chooses to complete harvest less often at 76 percent of the years.  If the 
lump sum penalty is smaller at $500 dollars, farm 1 still chooses to complete harvest 84 
percent of the years.  Inference from the differences in NPV of after tax cash flows and 
standard deviations with a lump sum penalty of $2,500 are similar to the base case.  
Because changes in the differences in NPV of after tax cash flows are only in magnitude, 
specific results of the lump sum penalty payment are not presented.   
Two-Farm Cash Flows – Nash Equilibrium 
 Two obvious inferences arise from the results.  First, the best option for each 
farm is to share machinery and pay zero percent of the shared costs.  Second, farm 1 
desires the no penalty contract, whereas, farm 2 is better off with the full penalty (base 
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case) for untimely machinery delivery.  These two inferences indicate there is room for 
contract negotiation.  Further, they suggest a closer inspection of the total differences of 
NPV after tax cash flows for farm 1 and farm 2 is warranted.  The two-farm NPV after 
tax cash flow is the sum of the differences for both farms.  Positive values indicate 
improvement in the total two-farm welfare from sharing machinery, whereas, negative 
values indicate the farms taken together would be better off not sharing machinery.   
As expected, the maximization of NPV of after tax cash flows occurs for each 
farm at the extreme case where the other farm pays 100 percent of the shared costs.  The 
Nash equilibrium, however, is found by maximizing the joint or combined expected 
NPV of after tax cash flows for the two farms.  The percentage of shared costs that 
results in the two-farm cash flows maximum is also the Nash equilibrium (Table 6.4). 
Two-Farm Cash Flows with Compensation 
Two-farm cash flows are positive for all percentages of shared costs and farm 
combinations when using either the base penalty or no penalty (Table 6.4).  As the 
overlap in harvest windows decreases, two-farm cash flows increase with the largest 
two-farm welfare being associated with the Pampa – Big Sandy combination.  In the 
Pampa – Pampa combination, the largest two-farm cash flows for both the base penalty 
and no penalty cases is where farm 1 pays 75 percent of the shared costs.  In the base 
penalty case, the farms are better off by $176,400 from sharing machinery.  In the 
Pampa – Dumas combination, two-farm cash flows are largest at $192,600 when farm 1 
pays 25 percent of the shared costs with the base penalty.  Both the Pampa – Akron and 
Pampa – Big Sandy combinations, however, have the largest overall two-farm cash  
   
 
Table 6.4  Two-Farm Expected NPV of After Tax Cash Flows Differences for the Base Penalty and No 
Penalty Payments for Each Farm Combination Assuming Different Percentages of Shared Costs Paid (in 
Hundred Thousand Dollars) 
  Pampa & Pampa Pampa & Dumas Pampa & Akron Pampa & Big Sandy Akron & Big Sandy
Farm 1 Pays 100% 
Base Penalty 1.727 1.656 2.763 3.152 2.510
No Penalty 1.704 1.657 2.774 3.152 2.499
Farm 1 Pays 75% 
Base Penalty 1.764 1.799 3.055 3.379 2.440
No Penalty 1.735 1.796 3.065 3.379 2.427
Farm 1 Pays 50% 
Base Penalty 1.749 1.892 3.318 3.562 2.345
No Penalty 1.715 1.886 3.327 3.562 2.330
Farm 1 Pays 25% 
Base Penalty 1.683 1.926 3.541 3.687 2.223
No Penalty 1.644 1.916 3.549 3.687 2.207
Farm 1 Pays 0% 
Base Penalty 1.571 1.901 3.722 3.751 2.076
No Penalty 1.529 1.887 3.729 3.751 2.057
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flows when farm 1 pays zero percent of the shared costs in the no penalty case.  Two-
farm cash flows are largest in the Akron – Big Sandy combination at $251,000 when 
farm 1 pays 100 percent of the shared costs with the base penalty.  Similar results are 
obtained for the no penalty case.   
Interestingly, when the harvest windows highly overlap (Pampa – Pampa and 
Pampa – Dumas) or partially overlap (Akron – Big Sandy), the base penalty case 
provides the largest two-farm cash flows at all percentages of shared costs except when 
farm 1 pays 100 percent of the shared costs in the Pampa – Dumas combination.  When 
the harvest windows partially overlap (Pampa – Akron and Akron – Big Sandy), results 
are ambiguous.  The no penalty case provides the largest two-farm cash flows in the 
Pampa – Akron combination and the base penalty provides the largest two-farm cash 
flows in the Akron – Big Sandy combination.  In the case where the harvest window 
decreases to almost no overlap (Pampa – Big Sandy), both the base penalty and no 
penalty two-farm cash flows are nearly identical.   
Largest two-farm cash flows with the base penalty and no penalty for all 
combinations coincide with economic theory from society’s vantage point, in that 
optimal sharing occurs when the absolute value of marginal differences of NPV of after 
tax cash flows for both farms are equal.  From the theoretical results, optimal sharing is 
where marginal differences from farm 1 equal one minus the negative of the marginal 
differences from farm 2 (see Chapter III).  Marginal differences are calculated by 
subtracting differences in NPV of after tax cash flows associated with two percentages 
of shared costs.  For example, in the Pampa – Pampa combination for the base penalty 
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case, differences in NPV of after tax cash flows for farm 1 when going from 50 to 75 
percent of the shared costs are $191,700 and $33,800 (Table 6.1).  The marginal 
difference for farm 1 when going from 50 to 75 percent of the shared costs is -$157,900 
($33,800 – $191,700).  The marginal difference for farm 2 at these same percentages of 
shared costs is $159,400 ($142,600 – -$16,800).  This example also happens to be the 
case where marginal differences are closest in value for the different percentages given.  
Thus, optimal sharing (defined as providing the largest total or combined change in NPV 
of after tax cash flows) occurs in the Pampa – Pampa combination when farm 1 pays 75 
percent of the shared costs.  Optimal sharing results in the simulation model coincide 
with economic theory and the theoretical optimal sharing rules from the Nash 
equilibrium for all farm combinations.  Results are consistent even though theoretical 
results are derived using small infinitesimal changes, but empirical results are associated 
with large percentage changes. 
Among the penalties examined, the differences in two-farm cash flow values are 
small.  The range of differences in two-farm cash flows is small because farm 1 is 
compensating for farm 2’s yield loss associated with untimely machinery delivery when 
using a penalty or gaining additional net revenue from completing harvest when there is 
no penalty.  Differences in the two-farm cash flows are because of yield losses occurring 
beyond the contracted delivery date and the inclusion of taxes.  The penalties result in 
almost a zero sum transfer; two-farm cash flows are distribution neutral between the two 
farms. 
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  Even though the highest two-farm cash flow values mentioned above result in 
highest overall farms’ welfare, individual farms are not always better off.  For instance, 
in the Pampa – Dumas combination two-farm cash flow is largest when farm 1 pays 25 
percent of the shared costs.  Dumas, however, is not better off sharing machinery (Table 
6.1).  For Dumas to agree to share machinery with Pampa paying 25 percent of the 
shared costs, Pampa must compensate Dumas at least $152,200.  Farmers will not agree 
to share machinery and knowingly lose money without compensation. 
Two-Farm Cash Flows without Compensation 
To avoid additional compensation beyond the penalty payment issues, cases 
where both farms are not better off from machinery sharing are eliminated.  Here, only 
two-farm cash flows are considered where the individual differences in NPV of after tax 
cash flows are positive for both farms (see Table 6.1).  In the Pampa – Pampa and 
Pampa – Dumas combinations with the base penalty, the only scenario where both farms 
are better off from sharing machinery is when farm 1 pays 75 percent of the shared costs.   
In the Pampa – Akron and Pampa – Big Sandy combinations, both farms are better off 
sharing machinery when the percentage of shared costs paid by farm 1 is either 25, 50, 
or 75 percent; the highest two-farm welfare occurs when farm 1 pays 25 percent of the 
shared costs in the both the base and no penalty cases.  With the base penalty, the only 
scenario where both farms are better off sharing machinery in the Akron – Big Sandy 
combination is when the farms equally share costs.  In the no penalty case, two-farm 
welfare is maximized when farm 1 pays 75 percent of the costs.  The highest two-farm 
cash flow for the Akron – Big Sandy combination is the base penalty case.   
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Small Harvesting Machinery Set 
As previously discussed, both small and large farms may benefit from sharing 
machinery.  Small firms may have access to larger, more efficient machinery that would 
otherwise not be affordable and large firms may be able to reduce capital investment 
costs and potentially capitalize on economies of size.  Firms sharing machinery, 
however, may face decreased production if the shared machines are not available at the 
point of production when needed.   
In the previous scenarios, the harvesting machinery requires 25 workable 
harvesting days to complete harvest regardless of sharing or non-sharing the equipment.  
In this section, a smaller harvesting machinery set is assumed when non-sharing 
harvesting machinery.  This smaller harvesting machinery set requires 35 workable 
harvesting days to complete harvest.  When a smaller harvesting machinery set is used, 
time to complete harvesting, operating costs, and repair costs increase.  Fuel and lube 
costs increase to $7.34 per acre, labor increases to $4.40 per acre, repairs increase to 
$5.82 per acre, interest increases by four cents to $9.08 per acre, and depreciation 
decreases to $8.62 per acre.  Purchase price, however, for the smaller harvesting 
machinery decreases from $240,000 to $120,000 per combine.  Yield loss for each farm 
increases when non-sharing harvesting machinery because the smaller machinery set 
requires 10 additional workable harvesting days to complete harvest.      
Differences in NPV of after tax cash flows and two-farm cash flows for the 
Pampa – Akron combination with a smaller harvesting machinery set are given in Table 
6.5.  Differences in Table 6.5 are calculated as shared NPV with the larger machinery set  
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Table 6.5 Differences in Expected Values, Standard Deviations, and Two-Farm 
NPV of After Tax Cash Flows for the Base Penalty Payment, a Small Non-Shared 
Machinery Set, and Assuming Different Percentages of Shared Costs Paid (in 
Hundred Thousand Dollars) 
  Pampa Akron Pampa & Akron 
 
Differences in Cash 
Flows 
Differences in Cash 
Flows 
Two-Farm Cash 
Flows 
Farm 1 Pays 100% 
Mean  0.164  5.148  5.312 
Standard Deviation -0.063 -0.023 -0.074 
Farm 1 Pays 75% 
Mean  1.789  3.815  5.604 
Standard Deviation -0.129 -0.025 -0.132 
Farm 1 Pays 50% 
Mean  3.389  2.478  5.867 
Standard Deviation -0.206 -0.025 -0.196 
Farm 1 Pays 25% 
Mean  4.953  1.137  6.090 
Standard Deviation -0.287 -0.023 -0.263 
Farm 1 Pays 0% 
Mean  6.481 -0.209  6.272 
Standard Deviation -0.363 -0.017 -0.321 
 
 
 
(25 workable days required to complete harvest) minus non-shared NPV with the 
smaller machinery set (35 workable days required to complete harvest).  For all 
percentages of shared costs, differences in NPV of after tax cash flows are positive for 
the Pampa farm.  Pampa is better off sharing the larger harvesting machinery because 
harvesting is timelier and costs may be smaller when sharing machinery.  When Pampa 
(farm 1) pays none of the shared costs, Akron is better off using the smaller machinery 
set and not sharing.  Because there are 25 days of uncompensated yield loss as assumed 
in the contract when sharing machinery, it is costly for Akron to delay harvest.   
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Results indicate that when Pampa pays 25 percent or more of the shared costs, 
Akron is better off delaying harvest and harvesting at a faster rate using the larger 
harvesting machinery set than harvesting when wheat is ready to harvest with the smaller 
machinery set.  Risk is reduced in all cases by machinery sharing.  Two-farm cash flow 
differences inference is similar to that discussed under the base penalty case.  This one 
example clearly shows the use of machinery sharing to obtain the use of larger 
machinery is a viable option producers may want to consider.   
Alternative Depreciation Sharing 
 Tax deductions including depreciation help determine taxable income used in 
calculating after tax cash flows.  Because firms sharing machinery are assumed to have 
formed a limited liability company, depreciation of shared machinery can be allocated 
unequally.  The impact of the percentage of shared machinery depreciation deducted by 
each farm in the Pampa – Akron combination on differences in NPV of after tax cash 
flows is given in Table 6.6.  Pampa and Akron are the base case farms previously 
discussed; however, the percentage of depreciation deducted by each farm is varied.  
Recall, shared machinery is 100 percent financed.  
For both farms, the higher the percentage of depreciation deducted the larger the 
differences in NPV of after tax cash flows.  This occurs because the higher the 
percentage of depreciation deducted the lower the amount of federal income taxes paid.  
Lower taxes paid, ceteris paribus, the higher the net after tax cash flows.  At all 
percentages of shared depreciation, differences in NPV of after tax cash flows are 
positive for both farms when the percentage of shared costs paid by the Pampa farm is 
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either 50 or 75 percent.  Risk, however, is reduced for both farms at all percentages of 
shared depreciation when Pampa pays 50 percent or less of the shared costs. 
As defined previously, two-farm NPV of after tax cash flow is “the sum of the 
differences for both farms.”  Two-farm cash flows are largest for all percentages of 
shared costs when Pampa deducts zero percent of the shared machinery depreciation 
(Table 6.7).  This occurs because Akron generally has a higher taxable income because 
of higher yields.  The largest two-farm cash flows occur when Akron pays all the costs 
and uses all the depreciation.  Again, higher taxable income is the reason for this result.  
The costs do not change, but who pays the costs does change.  Recall, the two-farm cash 
flows are distribution neutral.  The impact of taxes and depreciation is illustrated using 
the scenario where both farms pay 50% of the shared costs.  In this scenario, when 
Pampa moves from using 100% of the depreciation deduction to zero percent, Pampa 
NPV after tax cash flows decrease by $37,100 ($208,400 – $171,300 from Table 6.6).  
At the same time, Akron’s net after tax cash flows increase by $112,900 ($192,600 – 
$79,700 from Table 6.6).   
The standard deviations of the two-farm differences are given in Table 6.7.  The 
combination of Akron paying all costs and taking all depreciation deductions also results 
in the largest reduction in risk for the two-farm cash flows.  In addition, risk for two-
farm cash flows is reduced at all percentages of shared costs and all percentages of 
depreciation over non-sharing harvesting machinery.  
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Table 6.6 Differences in Expected Values and Standard Deviations of NPV 
of After Tax Cash Flows for Different Percentages of Shared Depreciation 
Deducted by Pampa in the Pampa and Akron Combination Assuming 
Different Percentages of Shared Costs Paid (in Hundred Thousand 
Dollars) 
Farm 1 Depreciation 
Deduction 0% 50% 100% 
 Pampa Akron Pampa Akron Pampa Akron 
Farm 1 Pays 100% 
Mean -1.434 4.610 -1.284 4.047 -1.189 3.455 
Standard Deviation -0.153 -0.023 -0.032 -0.066 0.064 -0.095 
Farm 1 Pays 75% 
Mean 0.155 3.269 0.341 2.714 0.457 2.127 
Standard Deviation -0.225 -0.021 -0.098 -0.068 0.009 -0.099 
Farm 1 Pays 50% 
Mean 1.713 1.926 1.941 1.377 2.084 0.797 
Standard Deviation -0.305 -0.018 -0.175 -0.068 -0.058 -0.103 
Farm 1 Pays 25% 
Mean 3.240 0.579 3.506 0.036 3.682 -0.534 
Standard Deviation -0.387 -0.014 -0.256 -0.066 -0.133 -0.105 
Farm 1 Pays 0% 
Mean 4.732 -0.772 5.033 -1.310 5.248 -1.869 
Standard Deviation -0.458 -0.005 -0.332 -0.060 -0.204 -0.104 
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Table 6.7 Two-Farm Expected Values and Standard Deviations of NPV 
of After Tax Cash Flows for Different Percentages of Shared 
Depreciation Paid by Pampa in the Pampa and Akron Combination 
Assuming Different Percentages of Shared Costs Paid (in Hundred 
Thousand Dollars) 
Farm 1 Depreciation 
Deduction 0% 50% 100% 
Farm 1 Pays 100% 
Mean 3.176 2.763 2.266 
Standard Deviation -0.145 -0.083 -0.025 
Farm 1 Pays 75% 
Mean 3.423 3.055 2.584 
Standard Deviation -0.202 -0.141 -0.078 
Farm 1 Pays 50% 
Mean 3.640 3.318 2.881 
Standard Deviation -0.266 -0.205 -0.140 
Farm 1 Pays 25% 
Mean 3.819 3.541 3.147 
Standard Deviation -0.331 -0.272 -0.206 
Farm 1 Pays 0% 
Mean 3.960 3.722 3.379 
Standard Deviation -0.382 -0.330 -0.265 
 
 
 
Percentage of Debt Free Land and Non-Shared Machinery 
 In the previous scenarios, both farms have 75 percent of their land and non-
shared machinery debt free.  In the following scenarios, this assumption is changed.  As 
discussed previously, the percentage of land and machinery that is debt free is important 
in determining yearly interest payments and may impact the decision to share machinery.  
A farmer who owns his/her machinery and land debt free, for example, would have 
smaller tax deductions relative to a farmer who has higher debt.  Differences in NPV of 
after tax cash flows for varying percentages of shared depreciation and shared costs for 
the Pampa – Akron combination are given in Table 6.8 at different debt levels.  Pampa 
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and Akron farms are the base case farms with the exception of the percentages of debt 
free land and shared depreciation.   
When the percentage of shared machinery depreciation claimed increases for 
either farm, mean differences in NPV of after tax cash flows increase at all percentages 
of shared costs (Table 6.7).  Similarly, when the percentage of debt free land and non-
shared machinery decreases, mean differences in NPV of after tax cash flows generally 
increase at all percentages of shared costs and percentages of depreciation (Table 6.8).  
 Depreciation becomes more valuable as the percentage of debt free land and 
machinery increases because of larger taxable income from reduced interest payments.  
Differences of differences in NPV of after tax cash flows are larger as the percentage of 
debt free land and non-shared machinery increases.  Alternatively, when the debt free 
percentage is small, there are larger tax deductions and the depreciation is not always 
used.  To illustrate what the differences of differences means, consider the following 
example.  Consider the case where Akron is zero percent debt free and Pampa pays 100 
percent of the shared costs (Table 6.8).  Mean differences in NPV of after tax cash flows 
for Akron are $492,000 and $408,000 when Pampa deducts zero percent and 100 percent 
of the shared depreciation.  When Akron is 100 percent debt free and Pampa pays 100 
percent of the shared costs, however, differences in NPV of after tax cash flows are 
$458,300 and $336,400 when Pampa deducts zero and 100 percent of the shared 
depreciation.  The difference in NPV differences for Akron when it is 100 percent debt 
free is $121,900 ($458,300 – $336,400), which is larger than the case where Akron is 
zero percent debt free, $84,000 ($492,00 – $408,000).  Differences of differences in 
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NPV of after tax cash flows for both Pampa and Akron at all percentages of shared costs 
are larger when the percentage of debt free land and non-shared machinery increases.  
This indicates there is an interaction between depreciation and the debt free percentage 
that impacts the NPV of after tax cash flows.      
Another example is the case where Pampa is zero percent debt free and paying 
zero percent of the shared costs.  Differences in NPV of after tax cash flows for Pampa 
are $545,100 and $551,200 when Pampa deducts zero and 100 percent of the shared 
depreciation (Table 6.8).  The difference of the differences is $6,100 ($545,100 – 
$551,200).  When Pampa is 100 percent debt free and Pampa pays zero percent of the 
shared costs, however, differences in NPV of after tax cash flows are $417,500 and 
$495,900 when Pampa deducts zero and 100 percent of the shared depreciation.  The 
difference of the differences is $78,400 ($495,900 – $417,500), which is larger than the 
case where Pampa is zero percent debt free ($6,100).  Differences of differences in NPV 
of after tax cash flows for Pampa are $53,000 when Pampa pays 100 percent of the 
shared costs instead of zero percent.  Differences of differences decrease as the 
percentage of shared costs paid increase and increase as the percentage of shared 
depreciation increases.  These two inferences indicate that there may be trade-offs 
between the percentages of shared costs paid and shared depreciation claimed when 
considering different levels of debt free land and non-shared machinery. 
   
 
Table 6.8 Differences in Expected Values and Standard Deviations of NPV of After Tax Cash Flows for Different 
Percentages of Shared Depreciation and Debt Free Land and Non-Shared Machinery for the Pampa and Akron 
Combination Assuming Different Percentages of Shared Costs Paid (in Hundred Thousand Dollars) 
% Debt Free 
(Farms 1-2) 100 – 0% 100 – 0% 100 – 0% 0 – 100% 0 – 100% 0 – 100% 
Farm 1 % 
Depreciation 0% 50% 100% 0% 50% 100% 
 Pampa Akron Pampa Akron Pampa Akron Pampa Akron Pampa Akron Pampa Akron
Farm 1 Pays 100% 
Mean -1.616 4.920 -1.307 4.524 -1.086 4.080 -1.285 4.583 -1.265 3.976 -1.251 3.364
Standard 
Deviation -0.161 -0.202 -0.034 -0.337 0.097 -0.456 -0.046 -0.007 -0.017 -0.030 0.004 -0.051
Farm 1 Pays 75% 
Mean -0.130 3.480 0.212 3.099 0.472 2.675 0.402 3.254 0.426 2.652 0.442 2.044
Standard 
Deviation -0.232 -0.142 -0.115 -0.283 0.017 -0.409 -0.059 -0.011 -0.027 -0.036 -0.002 -0.058
Farm 1 Pays 50% 
Mean 1.327 2.023 1.697 1.660 1.993 1.252 2.087 1.923 2.114 1.327 2.134 0.723
Standard 
Deviation -0.288 -0.075 -0.182 -0.222 -0.054 -0.356 -0.074 -0.014 -0.038 -0.041 -0.010 -0.065
Farm 1 Pays 25% 
Mean 2.759 0.547 3.157 0.204 3.486 -0.186 3.771 0.591 3.801 0.002 3.825 -0.602
Standard 
Deviation -0.328 -0.005 -0.234 -0.159 -0.114 -0.299 -0.091 -0.017 -0.052 -0.047 -0.020 -0.071
Farm 1 Pays 0% 
Mean 4.175 -0.944 4.601 -1.267 4.959 -1.639 5.451 -0.744 5.486 -1.328 5.512 -1.928
Standard 
Deviation -0.356 0.064 -0.274 -0.093 -0.164 -0.241 -0.111 -0.018 -0.068 -0.050 -0.033 -0.075 118
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Table 6.9 Two-Farm Expected Values and Standard Deviations of NPV of After Tax Cash Flows for 
Different Percentages of Shared Depreciation and Debt Free Land and Non-Shared Machinery for the 
Pampa and Akron Combination Assuming Different Percentages of Shared Costs Paid (in Hundred 
Thousand Dollars) 
% Debt Free (Farm 1 
– Farm 2) 100 – 0% 100 – 0% 100 – 0% 0 – 100% 0 – 100% 0 - 100% 
Farm 1 % 
Depreciation 0% 50% 100% 0% 50% 100% 
Farm 1 Pays 100% 
Mean 3.304 3.217 2.995 3.298 2.711 2.113
Standard Deviation -0.309 -0.334 -0.338 -0.046 -0.040 -0.039
Farm 1 Pays 75% 
Mean 3.350 3.311 3.147 3.656 3.078 2.486
Standard Deviation -0.308 -0.350 -0.361 -0.063 -0.055 -0.053
Farm 1 Pays 50% 
Mean 3.350 3.357 3.245 4.010 3.442 2.857
Standard Deviation -0.289 -0.348 -0.370 -0.081 -0.072 -0.067
Farm 1 Pays 25% 
Mean 3.306 3.361 3.300 4.361 3.803 3.223
Standard Deviation -0.253 -0.329 -0.366 -0.100 -0.091 -0.083
Farm 1 Pays 0% 
Mean 3.231 3.334 3.320 4.708 4.157 3.584
Standard Deviation -0.209 -0.299 -0.355 -0.121 -0.109 -0.099
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Interestingly, as in the previous scenarios, risk is not always reduced for both 
farms in all of the Pampa – Akron combinations.  In three cases, Pampa has increased 
risk from sharing machinery, whereas, risk is reduced in all cases for Akron.  Even 
though Pampa has increased risk from sharing machinery in some combinations, two-
farm standard deviations are negative for all cases of the Pampa – Akron combination 
(Table 6.9).  This result indicates that overall risk in NPV of after tax cash flows is 
reduced for all cases of the Pampa – Akron combination.    
Total yearly shared machinery ownership costs ($117,067 including principal 
and interest) are higher than the tax deductible depreciation ($83,492) from shared 
machinery.  As the percentage of debt free land and non-shared machinery increases, 
however, depreciation may become more valuable because of smaller tax deductions.  
The potential tradeoff between the percentage of shared costs paid and the percentage of 
depreciation used at different percentages of debt free land and non-shared machinery is 
shown by examining one Pampa – Akron combination.  Here, Pampa is zero percent 
debt free and Akron is 100 percent debt free.  In this case, depreciation may be more 
important to Akron than Pampa because Akron has smaller tax deductions.  From Table 
6.8, it is evident that Akron is not willing to pay a higher percentage of the shared costs 
to deduct a higher percentage of shared depreciation.  The scenarios in this table, 
however, are lumpy because of the large changes in percentages used.  As an alternative, 
consider the case where Akron pays 55 percent of the shared costs and deducts 75 
percent of the shared machinery depreciation.  In this case, differences in NPV of after 
tax cash flows are larger for both farms at $244,000 for Pampa and $136,000 for Akron 
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than equal sharing of costs and shared depreciation ($211,400 for Pampa and $132,700 
for Akron).  This one example illustrates farms need to consider tax consequences in 
determining percentages of shared costs and depreciation.  Proper contractual 
arrangements can increase individual and two-farm cash flows.  Not all arrangements 
involve tradeoffs between the two farms when smaller percentage changes are 
considered.   
Sensitivity Analysis 
 Additionally, sensitivity analysis on the NPV of after tax cash flows is conducted 
by varying the discount rate, yield reduction from untimely machinery delivery, yields, 
and prices.  Inferences on the NPV of after tax cash flows are the same as the base 
penalty scenario when the discount rate varies from three to nine percent.  In addition, 
inferences are similar to the base case when yield reduction from untimely harvesting 
varies from zero to 1 percent yield loss per day.  Recall, factors to increase or decrease 
yield and price are included in the model.  When the factor for yield varies from zero to 
10 percent and the factor for price varies from zero to 20 percent, inferences are similar 
to the base case.  Inferences, therefore, are robust relative to the assumptions made 
concerning these components of the model.          
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CHAPTER VII 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Businesses with seasonality in production, including agricultural production, may 
benefit from machinery sharing.  Machinery sharing, the use of a set of machinery by 
two or more firms, may provide a way to reduce costs and boost revenues to increase 
profitability.  Consider two farms sharing a combine.  A single combine is used to 
harvest acreage on two farms instead of one.  Purchasing costs for the two farms are 
reduced when sharing the combine compared with purchasing two separate combines.  
Variable costs for operating the combine, however, increase because of increased use of 
the combine.  Harvesting timeliness, dependent on the climate variability and 
geographical location of the farms, is an important determinant of each farms’ revenues.  
Optimal harvesting times, along with specified contractual arrangements, will determine 
whether machinery sharing is a viable management tool for each particular farm. 
Previous research on machinery sharing is limited.  Only a few studies have 
considered machinery sharing in the context of European farm co-operatives and 
agricultural production.  Many studies, however, have looked at individual components 
related to machinery sharing including machinery set selection, labor requirements, 
climate variability, harvesting windows, and yield reduction.  None, however, have 
considered machinery sharing in the U.S., while accounting for these components, along 
with harvesting windows, yield loss from untimely machinery delivery, and contractual 
issues.  This dissertation is the first comprehensive study of many of these issues. 
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The overall objective of this dissertation is to determine the impacts of 
machinery sharing on two firms engaged in machinery sharing.  Two models, a Nash 
equilibrium game theoretical model and an applied two-farm simulation model, are used 
to attain this objective.  A single period Nash equilibrium theoretical model for two 
firms sharing machinery determines the theoretical optimal sharing rules.  This single 
shot game theory model, based on continuous differentiable functions, uses calculus to 
maximize the objective function.  Optimal machinery sharing rules are defined as the 
percentage of total shared machinery costs borne by each firm.  Sharing does not occur 
when the equilibrium is not within the economic feasible region.  The Nash equilibrium 
model also illustrates the importance of harvesting windows.      
Because of the generality of the functional forms considered in the theoretical 
model, an empirical simulation model of two farms sharing machinery is developed to 
provide more specific inferences.  The basis for the simulation model is the Nash 
equilibrium model.  Components of both models include the normal components, such 
as costs, yields, and prices, found in most if not all farm models.  Unique to both models 
are components associated with sharing machinery, such as harvesting windows for each 
farm, yield reduction associated with untimely delivery of the machinery, and machinery 
sharing contractual arrangements.  The farm simulation model is a discrete-time multi-
year model.  Net present values of after tax cash flows for each farm are determined and 
sensitivity analysis is conducted by varying the contract terms, specifically, the 
percentage of shared machinery costs paid by each farm.  In additional to the percentage 
of shared machinery costs, other contractual issues examined are penalty payment 
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structures for untimely machinery delivery and percentage of shared machinery 
depreciation.  The simulation model is unique in that two farms are simultaneously 
simulated.  Machinery sharing as a method to increase cash flows and reduce risk 
compared to sole ownership is evaluated using the two-farm simulation model.  
Contractual issues’ effects on cash flows are also examined. 
Four geographically diverse farms are developed.  Machinery sharing between 
two of the farms occurs by simultaneously simulating two of the farms.  Farm 
combinations are chosen such that harvesting windows range from highly overlapping to 
having virtually no overlap.  Both federal self-employment and income taxes are 
included in the two-farm simulation model. 
Contributions 
This dissertation contributes to the understanding of machinery sharing effects on 
both farms entering into a machinery sharing contract.  To the author’s knowledge, no 
study has examined contractual arrangement issues in the context of machinery sharing.  
Further, a methodological contribution, modeling biophysical crop characteristics and 
two-farms simultaneously in an economic simulation model, is also garnered.  Inferences 
from the simulation model are robust relative to the assumptions made on model 
components.  Further, as expected, inferences from both the theoretical model and 
applied simulation model are consistent, even though the two models differ in their 
methodological approach.     
Inferences from both models help explain why machinery sharing is observed but 
not widely practiced in today’s farming operations.  The simulation model suggests that 
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machinery sharing can increase NPV of after tax cash flows over non-sharing 
machinery.  Further, simulation results show machinery sharing may reduce risk 
associated with cash flows.  These results are dependent on farm specific characteristics 
and contractual arrangements.  These results suggest those producers sharing machinery 
have overcome contractual problems and most likely are experiencing increased cash 
flows.      
Machinery sharing, however, occurs only when there is a feasible economic 
equilibrium.  Equilibriums outside the feasible region (black holes) can be caused by 
high marginal transaction costs and/or small marginal shared costs relative to own 
marginal net returns.  Large transaction costs may be caused by firm inefficiencies.  
There can be expected risk reductions and increases in NPV of after tax cash flows when 
sharing machinery.  Even though overall NPV of after tax cash flows are improved when 
sharing machinery, in many of the scenarios presented one farm is gaining at the expense 
of the other farm.  For example, in the Pampa – Dumas combination and base penalty 
case where Pampa pays 25 percent of the shared costs, Pampa gains $344,800 and 
Dumas loses $152,200 over non-sharing harvesting machinery.   
Another reason machinery sharing is not widely practiced is because of small 
potential increase in cash flows.  Gains from machinery sharing, for example, may be 
small in comparison to annual farm revenue.  Consider the Pampa – Akron combination 
in the base penalty case where farm 1 pays 25 percent of the shared costs.  In this 
combination, Pampa gains approximately $70,000 per year, whereas, Akron gains 
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approximately $700 per year.  Akron’s gain is small compared to the value of the whole 
farm with million dollar annual revenues.   
The third reason that machinery sharing may not be widely practiced is because 
of additional transactions costs, such as finding a farmer to share machinery and trust 
issues.  Such non-market psychological transaction costs are not modeled.  Two farms 
owned or operated by the same entity, however, that are able to utilize their own unique 
capabilities and resources to reduce own transaction costs may be able to overcome these 
non-market issues and be more likely to share machinery.  Some producers interviewed 
at the Association of Agricultural Production Executives 2008 meetings, for example, 
share machinery on two geographically diverse farms that are operated by the same firm. 
Machinery sharing is a potential risk management tool for agribusiness firms.  
Generally, NPV of after tax cash flow risk is reduced when sharing machinery.  Findings 
also suggest there are interactions among percentages of shared costs paid, yield losses 
associated with sharing machinery, and the penalty paid to compensate for yield losses. 
Percentage of Shared Costs 
A potential reasonable assumption to reduce transaction costs and facilitate 
machinery sharing is for two identical size farms to equally share costs associated with 
machinery sharing.  When two firms are homogenous, the Nash equilibrium theoretical 
model suggests that firms will equally pay shared costs.  In reality, farms sharing 
machinery are not homogenous.  In the two-farm simulation model, all farms harvest 
5,000 acres per year; however, because of different soil types, the effects of climate 
variability, and yield losses from delayed harvesting, the farms are not homogenous.  
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This becomes very apparent in the Pampa – Pampa farm combination.  Theoretical 
conclusions and empirical results coincide in that the Nash equilibrium generally does 
not occur where the percentage of shared costs are 50 percent.  In the Pampa – Pampa 
combination, for example, optimal sharing occurs when farm 1 pays 75 percent of the 
shared costs.  The first farm to harvest (farm 1) must pay a larger portion of the costs to 
compensate the second farm (farm 2) for the 25 days of uncompensated yield loss 
associated with the first farm completing harvest.    
As suggested by the theoretical model conclusions (Chapter III) and shown in the 
empirical model results (Chapter VI), firms can increase net returns and NPV of after tax 
cash flows by paying a smaller percentage of the shared costs for all penalty payment 
scenarios.  Taking all the results together indicates there is room for negotiation when 
determining the percentage of shared costs each farm pays.  In addition, risk is generally 
reduced when sharing versus non-sharing harvesting machinery (Table 6.1).   
Penalty Paid for Untimely Machinery Delivery 
 Similar to the percentage of shared costs, the penalty structure is a contractual 
issue negotiated ex-ante.  The penalty is paid by farm 1 to farm 2 when machinery is not 
delivered to farm 2 by the contracted date.  Several penalty payments for untimely 
machinery delivery with different levels of harvesting risk borne by each farm are 
considered.  Inferences from the different penalty payments are robust. 
 As expected, the first farm to use the harvesting machinery prefers to shift all 
harvesting risk to the second farm (No Penalty).  Similarly, the second farm prefers to 
bear zero harvesting risk (Base Case).  In the base case, farm 1 bears all risk from 
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delaying machinery delivery because farm 1 compensates farm 2 for yield loss incurred 
beyond the contracted date.  When there is no penalty for untimely machinery delivery, 
farm 2 bears all harvesting risk associated with untimely machinery delivery.  In this 
case, farm 1 has no incentive to deliver the machinery by the contracted date.  Variations 
of the penalty payment, such as a 50 percent penalty payment, allow for equal sharing of 
the harvesting risk.  In the case of the lump sum penalty, the incentive for farm 1 to 
deliver the machinery by the contracted date depends on the penalty payment amount.  If 
the lump sum penalty is large enough, farm 1 will choose to deliver the machinery by the 
contracted date.  Obviously, the structure of the penalty payment preferred by each farm 
is dependent on the order of machinery usage and the penalty payment amount. 
 Inferences from the penalty payments for individual farms do not vary between 
penalty payments. In general, risk is reduced for all penalties.  Even though inferences 
are similar, an inspection of two-farm cash flows indicates the largest two-farm cash 
flows depend on the penalty payment and harvesting windows.  In general, the base 
penalty provides the largest two-farm cash flows when harvesting windows highly 
overlap.  No penalty provides the largest two-farm cash flows when there is almost no 
overlap in harvesting windows. When there is a partial overlap in harvesting windows, 
results are ambiguous.       
Harvesting Windows 
When harvesting windows highly overlap, both farms are individually better off 
(positive differences) sharing machinery only when farm 1 pays more than half of the 
shared costs.  Farm 1 must pay a larger percentage of the costs because farm 2 is 
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incurring uncompensated yield losses as s/he waits for the harvesting equipment.  There 
appears to be more room for negotiation when harvesting windows partially or do not 
overlap.  For instance, both farms are better off in the Pampa – Akron and Pampa – Big 
Sandy combinations when the percentage of shared costs paid by farm 1 ranges from 25 
to 75 percent.  Even though both farms are better off when sharing machinery within this 
range of percentage of shared costs, one farm gains at the expense of the other farm as 
the percentages change.  
Machinery Set Size 
 Firms sharing machinery may have access to larger, more efficient machinery 
that would otherwise be unaffordable.  To examine this postulate, sensitivity analysis on 
the size of machinery when sharing machinery is conducted.  The Pampa – Akron 
combination is reformulated such that when non-sharing machinery, smaller combines 
requiring 35 workable harvesting days to complete harvest are modeled.  A larger 
harvesting machinery set, as already assumed in the model when sharing machinery, is 
affordable and requires 25 workable harvesting days to complete harvest.     
The larger more efficient machinery set is associated with a smaller penalty 
payment because of smaller yield losses from timelier harvests.  Pampa, regardless of the 
percentage of shared costs paid, is always better off with machine sharing and using the 
larger machine.  Generally, Akron is better off delaying harvest and harvesting at a faster 
rate using the larger harvesting machinery set than harvesting on time at a slower rate 
using the smaller harvesting machinery set.  Only when Akron pays all the costs, is 
Akron better off with the smaller combine.  Using machinery sharing to obtain the use of 
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larger machinery, even at the expense of delaying harvest, is a viable option producers 
may want to consider. 
Percentage of Depreciation Claimed 
As expected, when a farm deducts a larger percentage of depreciation, ceteris 
paribus, machinery sharing becomes more profitable to that farm.  The reason is less 
federal income taxes are paid, therefore net after tax cash flows are larger.  There are 
interactions between depreciation and the level of debt free land and non-shared 
machinery that impacts the NPV of after tax cash flows.  Depreciation becomes more 
valuable as the percentage of debt free land and machinery increases because of smaller 
tax deductions from interest payments.  Farms with a larger taxable income can benefit 
more from using a larger percentage of tax deductible depreciation.  Alternatively, when 
the debt free percentage is small, there are larger tax deductions associated with interest 
payments.  When such large tax deductions are available, depreciation may not always 
be used even when considering carryover losses.   
There are potential tradeoffs between the percentage of shared costs paid and the 
percentage of shared depreciation claimed when different percentages of debt free land 
and non-shared machinery are considered.  The tradeoffs exist because NPV of after tax 
cash flows are larger when a larger percentage of depreciation is deducted and smaller 
when a larger percentage of shared costs is paid.  A farm with a high percentage of debt 
free land may be willing to pay more of the shared machinery costs in return to be able 
to deduct a higher percentage of the shared depreciation.  For farm managers considering 
machinery sharing, the percentages of debt free land and non-shared machinery, shared 
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costs, and depreciation are important items to consider when negotiating the machinery 
sharing contracts.  Proper contractual arrangements can increase both individual and 
two-farm cash flows. 
Limitations and Further Research 
 Besides the usual data and modeling assumptions limitations which are present in 
all studies, the results of this study have additional qualifications.  Results depend on the 
crop growth model used to generate yields and maturity dates.  Because of low simulated 
yields in some years, weather data are adjusted to reduce the effects of winter-kill caused 
by extended sub-zero temperature periods.  Furthermore, yield reduction rates post 
maturity are not included in the crop growth model.  A rate from published research 
articles is incorporated into the model. 
Two financial structures, sole-proprietorship when non-sharing and sole 
proprietorship with a limited liability company when sharing harvesting machinery, are 
assumed in the two-farm simulation model.  A farm’s financial structure has potential 
important tax consequences because tax regulations vary by the structural arrangement.  
Because the percentage of debt free land and non-shared machinery along with 
depreciation percentage claimed have important tax implications, thereby, affecting the 
NPV of after tax cash flows, other forms of financial structure may change the 
inferences presented in this dissertation.   
Depreciation is calculated using the straight-line depreciation method.  Other 
methods of calculating deprecation may also be important to machinery sharing.  For 
example, the double-declining balance depreciation method allows for greater tax 
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deductions in the first years of ownership, however, deducted depreciation above the 
value of the machinery must eventually be reconciled.  Such changes will affect the net 
present value of after tax cash flows.  Both farms sharing machinery are assumed to have 
the same acreage.  Effects of machinery sharing on different size of farms should be 
examined. 
Thinking beyond these models, several inferences on potential effects of 
machinery sharing can be made and future research suggested.  The models only 
consider the full information case.  A more likely scenario is that of asymmetric 
information where the actions of one producer affect the other.  A moral hazard problem, 
for example, may arise when one producer agrees to perform maintenance on the 
machinery as agreed in the contract, but only performs the maintenance shortly before 
delivery rather than according to manufacturers’ recommendations.  This and other 
asymmetric information issues should be studied in the machinery sharing context. 
Several assumptions regarding contractually negotiated items and firm specific 
components are made ex-ante and are considered fixed over the five year machinery 
sharing contract.  Fixed items include, for example, a lump sum penalty, the percentage 
of shared costs, and individual firm discount rates.  Relaxing these assumptions to allow 
for variability between years may influence the decision to share machinery.  Further, in 
addition to penalty payments for yield loss associated with untimely machinery delivery, 
penalties for reduction in grain quality may also be examined.    
Manufacturers and dealers may also need to adjust their product mix.  If by 
sharing machines, producers buy larger machines than they would without sharing, 
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manufacturers and dealers may have to shift their product mix towards larger, more 
efficient machines to accommodate any increase in demand.  Further, the equipment 
sector may want to offer specialized services as a strategy to gain additional profits from 
this emerging trend.  Studies examining the potential impact of machinery sharing on 
equipment manufacturers and dealers, as well as, the effects of increased competition on 
custom operators are warranted. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
This appendix consists of cumulative distribution function graphs of present 
value (PV) of revenues, costs, federal self employment and income taxes, penalties, and 
NPV of after tax cash flows and changes in whole-farm ending net worth for the Pampa 
– Pampa combination.  This combination is used to illustrate these different components 
of the model.  Other combinations have different specific curves, but general inferences 
are consistent.  Distributions at different percentages of shared costs when sharing 
harvesting machinery are illustrated in Figures A1 through A6 for the base penalty case.  
Distributions when non-sharing are also given as a comparison.  Recall, in the base 
penalty case farm 1 bears all risk and compensates farm 2 for losses in yield associated 
with untimely machinery delivery.   
Changes in solvency, liquidity, and profitability ratios over the five simulated 
years are also presented.  Solvency is determined using the debt-to-assets ratio which 
measures the extent of which debt has been used to finance business activities.  Liquidity 
is determined using the current ratio, which measures the ability of the firm to cover 
current liabilities with assets that can be converted to cash in the short term.  Profitability 
is determined using the return-on-assets ratio, which measures return on total 
investment.  Changes in the debt-to-assets ratio, the current ratio, and return-on-assets 
ratio are given in Figures A7 through A9.  Changes in ratios are determined by 
subtracting calculated ratios in first year from ratios calculated in the fifth year and then 
averaged over the 1000 iterations. 
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Revenues 
 The distribution of farm 1 PV of revenues are identical, as expected, for all 
percentages of shared costs when sharing machinery and are equal to the revenues when 
non-sharing harvesting machinery (Figure A1).  The distributions are identical because 
farm 1 uses the machinery first.  Therefore, there is no delay in harvesting for farm 1 
from untimely machinery delivery.  In addition, farm 1 always chooses to complete 
harvest given that crop insurance payments are not larger than revenues generated from 
harvesting plus government payments.   
Revenues for farm 2, however, vary only by sharing and non-sharing machinery.  
The decision made by farm 1 to continue harvesting or deliver the machinery is 
dependent on the penalty to be paid to farm 2.  When sharing machinery, farm 1 is 
required to compensate farm 2 for yield loss attributed to untimely machinery delivery.  
Therefore, the decision to retain the machinery and complete harvesting is costly to farm 
1 by the amount of the penalty payment.  Because in some years farm 1 chooses to 
complete harvest, incur the penalty payment, and delay machinery delivery, farm 2 
revenues are reduced.  In this base penalty case, however, farm 2 is fully compensated 
for yield loss from untimely machinery delivery.  Yield losses for farm 2 are not 
compensated for up to 25 days beyond farm 1’s harvest start date.  This explains why 
revenues from non-sharing are larger for farm 2 than when non-sharing machinery.   
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Figure A1. Cumulative distribution function graphs of present value (PV) of 
revenues for farm 1 (a) and farm 2 (b) in the Pampa – Pampa combination for non-
sharing and sharing machinery at different percentages of shared costs 
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Costs 
 
 PV of costs, excluding federal income and self-employment taxes and penalties, 
are illustrated in Figure A2.  For both farms, the distributions of costs are higher when 
paying a larger percentage of the shared costs.  Also, sharing machinery is more costly 
than non-sharing when paying 100 percent of the shared costs.  
There is little variation in the costs distributions.  Costs of production for each 
farm are determined from budgets given in Chapter V.  Variation in costs is caused by 
interest payments, and operating costs.  In years where harvest is not completed, 
harvesting costs are reduced.  
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Figure A2. Cumulative distribution function graphs of present value (PV) of costs 
for farm 1 (a) and farm 2 (b) in the Pampa – Pampa combination for non-sharing 
and sharing at different percentages of shared costs 
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Federal Income and Self-Employment Taxes 
 
 As taxable income increases, the amount of federal income and self-employment 
taxes also increases.  PV of taxes is illustrated in Figure A3.  Farm 1 has a higher 
probability of paying taxes when sharing machinery than farm 2.  As expected, taxes 
paid by both farms are identical when non-sharing machinery because the farms are 
identical.  Farm 1 has approximately a 30 percent probability of paying zero taxes when 
paying zero percent of the shared costs and approximately a 60 percent probability of 
paying zero taxes when paying 100 percent of the shared costs.  Farm 1 has 
approximately a 65 percent probability of paying zero taxes when non-sharing 
machinery.  
As discussed previously, revenues are smaller for farm 2 when sharing 
machinery.  This results in smaller net returns and less taxes paid by farm 2.  When farm 
2 pays 100 percent of the shared costs, the probability of paying taxes is almost 20 
percent.  Similar to farm 1, as farm 2 pays a smaller percentage of the shared costs the 
probability of paying taxes increases. 
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Figure A3. Cumulative distribution function graph of present value (PV) of federal 
income and self-employment taxes for farm 1 (a) and farm 2 (b) in the Pampa – 
Pampa combination for non-sharing and sharing at different percentages of shared 
costs 
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Penalty Payment 
 
 The PV of the penalty payment made by farm 1 and received by farm 2 is 
identical for both farms and always greater than or equal to zero (Figure A4).  When 
sharing machinery, the penalty paid by farm 1 has approximately a 45 percent 
probability of being greater than or equal to $10,000.  The penalty payment illustrated is 
that of the base case penalty payment where farm 1 bears all the risk and compensates 
farm 2 for all yield loss attributed to delayed machinery delivery. 
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Figure A4. Cumulative distribution function graphs of present value (PV) of 
penalties for farm 1 (a) and farm 2 (b) in the Pampa – Pampa combination for non-
sharing and sharing at different percentages of shared costs 
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NPV of After Tax Cash Flows 
 
 NPV of after tax cash flows are illustrated in Figure A5.  Depending on the 
percentage of shared costs paid, sharing machinery increases the probability of having 
positive cash flows for both farms.  For farm 1, NPV of after tax cash flows have a 
higher probability of being positive when farm 1 pays 75 percent or less of the shared 
costs than NPV associated with non-sharing of harvesting machinery.  Scenarios where 
farm 1 pays 75 percent or less of the shared costs first-order stochastically dominate the 
non-sharing scenario. The non-sharing scenario, however, first-order stochastically 
dominates the scenario where farm 1 pays 100 percent of the shared costs.  When paying 
zero percent of the shared costs, farm 1 has approximately an 85 percent probability of 
having a positive after tax cash flow as compared to less than 10 percent when paying 
100 percent of the shared costs.  
 For farm 2, the non-sharing machinery scenario second-order stochastically 
dominates sharing machinery when farm 2 pays 50 percent of the shared costs and first-
order stochastically dominates the scenarios where farm 2 pays more than 50 percent of 
the shared costs.  When non-sharing, farm 2 has approximately a 15 percent probability 
of having a positive after tax cash flow and approximately a 50 percent probability of 
having a positive cash flow when paying zero percent of the shared costs.  For this 
Pampa – Pampa combination, farm 1 would be willing to pay up to 75 percent of the 
shared costs and farm 2 would be willing to pay less than 50 percent of the shared costs.   
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Figure A5. Cumulative distribution function graphs of net present value (NPV) of 
after tax cash flows for farm 1 (a) and farm 2 (b) in the Pampa – Pampa 
combination for non-sharing and sharing at different percentages of shared costs 
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Changes in Ending Net Worth 
 Changes in the NPV of ending net worth are illustrated in Figure A6.  In the case 
of farm 1, changes in the NPV of ending net worth are larger when sharing at all 
percentages of shared costs than non-sharing.  The probability of having a positive 
change in ending net worth is 60 percent when non-sharing and at least 82 percent when 
sharing machinery.  For farm 2, scenarios where farm 2 pays less than 50 percent of the 
shared cost first-order stochastically dominate non-sharing, while paying zero percent of 
the shared costs only second-order stochastically dominates non-sharing.  Farm 1 is 
clearly better off, from the stand point of changes in ending net worth, sharing 
machinery and paying any percentage of shared costs.  Farm 2 is better off sharing 
machinery and paying 50 percent or less of the shared costs. 
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Figure A6. Cumulative distribution function graphs of changes in net present value 
(NPV) of ending net worth for farm 1 (a) and farm 2 (b) in the Pampa – Pampa 
combination for non-sharing and sharing at different percentages of shared costs 
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Changes in Debt-to-Assets Ratio 
  
The debt-to-assets ratio is calculated by dividing total liabilities by total assets.  
Changes in debt-to-assets ratio are determined by subtracting the debt-to-asset ratio in 
year one from the debt-to-asset ratio in year five.  For all scenarios of sharing and non-
sharing machinery, debt-to-assets ratios for both farms at all percentages of shared costs 
are reduced (Figure A7).  This result is not fully explained by sharing and non-sharing 
harvesting machinery because harvesting machinery is 100 percent financed in the first 
year and sold at the end of the fifth year.  Consequently, changes in debt-to-assets ratios 
from machinery sharing in the first and fifth year nearly equals zero.  The difference 
between harvesting machinery value and liabilities increases over the first four years as 
the value of machinery decreases at a slower rate than the liabilities.  Both the value and 
liability are zero when the harvesting machinery is sold at the end of the fifth year.     
Reduction in debt-to-assets ratios is partially explained by the increase in land 
value from the annual inflation rate of 6.7 percent.  Because land values represents such 
a large portion of the whole-farm worth, the denominator in the debt-to-assets ratio 
increases substantially as the value of assets increases.  As assets increase in value, the 
debt-to-assets ratio decreases, ceteris paribus.  For the two scenarios, non-sharing and 
paying 100 percent of the shared costs, debt-to-assets ratios for both farms decrease by 
the largest amount.  This indicates that the debt-to-assets ratio is reduced as the 
percentage of machinery ownership increases.  
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Figure A7. Cumulative distribution function graphs of changes in debt-to-assets 
ratios for farm 1 (a) and farm 2 (b) in the Pampa – Pampa combination for non-
sharing and sharing at different percentages of shared costs 
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Changes in Current Ratio 
 
 A cumulative distribution function graph of changes in the current ratio from 
year one to year five for both farms in the Pampa – Pampa combination is given in 
Figure A8.  The current ratio is determined by dividing total current assets by total 
current liabilities.  Change in the current ratio is determined by subtracting the current 
ratio in year 1 from that of year five.  If current liabilities are larger than current assets, 
the ratio is reduced and the farm may have trouble meeting its short-term debt 
obligations.  When changes in the current ratio are positive, there is an improvement in 
the farm’s ability to meet its short-term debt obligations.  When paying 50 percent of the 
shared costs, farm 1 has approximately a 50 percent probability of having a positive 
change in its current ratio. 
For farm 1, scenarios where farm 1 pays 25 percent or less of the shared costs 
first-order stochastically dominate non-sharing harvesting machinery.  Non-sharing 
second-order stochastically dominates the scenario where farm 1 pays 50 percent of the 
shared costs and first-order stochastically dominates the scenario where farm 1 pays 75 
percent or more of the shared costs.  For farm 2, paying zero percent of the shared costs 
second-order stochastically dominates non-sharing harvesting machinery.  Non-sharing, 
however, first-order stochastically dominates sharing when farm 1 pays 25 percent or 
more of the shared costs. 
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Figure A8. Cumulative distribution function graphs of changes in current ratios for 
farm 1 (a) and farm 2 (b) in the Pampa – Pampa combination for non-sharing and 
sharing at different percentages of shared costs 
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Changes in Return-on-Assets 
 
 Return-on-assets is a financial ratio for profitability that indicates how much 
profit is generated for each dollar of assets.  To calculate return-on-assets, net after tax 
cash flow income is divided by total assets.  Changes in the return-on-assets ratio is 
determined by subtracting the return-on-assets value in year one from the value of year 
five.   
 For farm 1, there is approximately an 85 percent probability that the change in 
return-on-assets will increase when non-sharing (Figure A9).  Non-sharing first-order 
stochastically dominates sharing when farm 1 pays 25 percent or more of the shared 
costs.  When farm 1 pays zero percent of the shared costs, however, sharing first-order 
stochastically dominates non-sharing.  For farm 2, non-sharing first-order stochastically 
dominates sharing at all percentages of shared costs.  This is expected because revenues 
are reduced for farm 2 when sharing machinery because of uncompensated yield loss 
(Figure A1).     
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Figure A9. Cumulative distribution function graphs of changes in return-on-assets 
ratios for farm 1 (a) and farm 2 (b) in the Pampa – Pampa combination for non-
sharing and sharing at different percentages of shared costs 
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